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Abstract
This paper derives upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff of a wiretap erasure broadcast channel
(BC) with Kw weak receivers and Ks strong receivers, where weak receivers, respectively strong receivers, have same erasure
probabilities and cache sizes. The lower bounds are achieved by schemes that meticulously combine joint cache-channel coding
with wiretap coding and key-aided one-time pads. The presented upper bound holds more generally for arbitrary degraded BCs and
arbitrary cache sizes. When only weak receivers have cache memories, upper and lower bounds coincide for small and large cache
memories, thus providing the exact secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff for this setup. The derived bounds allow to further conclude
that the secrecy capacity is positive even when the eavesdropper is stronger than all the legitimate receivers with cache memories.
Moreover, they show that the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff can be significantly smaller than its non-secure counterpart, but
it grows much faster when cache memories are small.
The paper also presents a lower bound on the global secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff where one is allowed to optimize
the cache assignment subject to a total cache budget. It is close to the best known lower bound without secrecy constraint. For
small total cache budget, the global secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff is achieved by assigning all the available cache memory
uniformly over all receivers if the eavesdropper is stronger than all legitimate receivers, and it is achieved by assigning the cache
memory uniformly only over the weak receivers if the eavesdropper is weaker than the strong receivers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traffic load in communication systems varies tremendously during the day between busy periods where the network is highly
congested causing packet loss, delivery delays and unsatisfied users and other periods where the network is barely used. Lately,
caching has emerged as a promising technique to reduce the network load and latency in such dense wireless networks. In
caching, the communication is divided into two phases: the caching phase and the delivery phase. The caching phase occurs
during the off-peak periods of the network, where fragments of popular contents are stored in users’ cache memories or on
nearby servers. The delivery phase occurs when users request specific files during the peak-traffic periods of the network and
they are served partly from their cache memories and partly from the server. The technical challenge in these networks is that
in the caching phase the servers do not know exactly which files the receivers will demand during the delivery phase. They
are thus obliged to store information about all possibly requested files in the receivers’ cache memories.
Maddah-Ali and Niesen showed in their seminal work [1] that the delivery (high-traffic) communication can benefit from
the cache memories more than the obvious local caching gain arising from locally retrieving parts of the requested files. The
additional gain, termed global caching gain, is obtained through carefully designing the cached contents and applying a new
coding scheme, termed coded caching, which allows the transmitter to simultaneously serve multiple receivers. In [1] and in
many subsequent works, the delivery phase is modelled as an error-free broadcast channel and all receivers have equal cache
sizes. Coded caching is straightforwardly extended to noisy BCs by means of a separate cache-channel coding architecture
where a standard BC code that ignores the cache contents is used to transmit the delivery-messages1 produced by the coded
caching algorithm to the receivers. Improved global caching gains can be achieved by employing joint cache-channel coding
where the encoder and the decoder simultaneously adapt to the cache contents and the channel statistics [2]–[5].
A different line of works has addressed secrecy issues in cache-aided BCs [6]–[8], where delivery communication takes
place over a noiseless link. Different secrecy requirements have been studied. In [6], [8], the entire library of messages needs
to be kept secret from an external eavesdropper that has access to the outputs of the common bit-pipe but not to the cache
memories. This is achieved by means of securing the XOR packets produced by coded caching with secret keys that have been
prestored at the receivers during the caching phase [6]. This approach has subsequently been extended to resolvable networks
in [9] and to device-to-device communication models [10]. In [7], each legitimate receiver acts also as eavesdropper and is thus
not allowed to learn anything about the files requested by the other receivers. In this case, uncoded fragments of the messages
cannot be stored in the users’ caches. Instead, random keys and combinations of messages XORed with these random keys are
cached. In the delivery phase, messages (or combination of messages) XORed with random keys are transmitted in a way that
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1Due to the presence of the cache memories the messages conveyed in the delivery phase, generally differ from the original messages in the library.
each message can be decoded only by its intended receiver. Secret communication has also been considered for cache-aided
heterogeneous and multiantenna interference networks, see for example [11], [12], and [13]. A different angle of attack on this
problem is taken in [14], which presents a privacy-preserving protocol that prevents eavesdroppers from learning which users
are requesting which files as well as the statistical popularities of the files.
In this paper, we follow the secrecy requirement in [6] where an external eavesdropper is not allowed to learn anything
about all the files in the library, but here delivery communication takes place over an erasure BC with one transmitter and
K ≥ 2 receivers. The eavesdropper does not have access to the cache memories but overhears the delivery communication
over the erasure BC. The main interest of this paper is the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff of such a system, i.e., the largest
message rate that allows to find encoding and decoding functions so that the normalized mutual information
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n) (1)
between all the messages W1, . . . ,WD of the library and the eavesdropper’s observations Z
n vanishes asymptotically for
increasing blocklengths n. In our previous work [15], we have addressed the weaker secrecy constraint where the eavesdropper
is not allowed to learn any information about each of the actually demanded messages individually. Each of the K mutual
informations 1
n
I(Wd1 ;Z
n), . . . , 1
n
I(WdK ;Z
n) thus needs to vanish asymptotically, where Wd1 , . . . ,WdK denoting the files
requested and delivered to Receivers 1, . . . ,K. Our conference publications [15] and [16] suggest that the ultimate performance
limits under these two secrecy constraints are close.
There are two basic approaches to render cache-aided BCs secure: 1) introduce binning to the non-secure coding schemes
so as to transform them into wiretap codes [17]; and 2) store secret keys into the cache memories and apply one-time pads
[18] to parts of the delivery-messages which can then be sent using non-secure channel codes. As we will see, in the BC
scenarios where different receivers have different cache sizes, combinations thereof should be employed. Moreover, by applying
superposition coding or joint cache-channel coding, secret keys stored in caches can even be used to secure the communication
to other receivers. Under secrecy constraints, further global caching gains are thus possible than the previously reported gains
for non-secure communication [1], [3].
Based on the described coding ideas, we propose lower bounds on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff of the cache-aided
erasure BC in Figure 1. The system consists of Kw weak receivers 1, . . . ,Kw that have equal erasure probability δw ≥ 0 and
cache size Mw, and Ks strong receivers Kw +1, . . . ,K that have equal erasure probability δs ≥ 0 and cache size Ms. We also
provide a general upper bound on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff of an arbitrary degraded BC with receivers having
arbitrary cache sizes. Upper and lower bounds match for the setup in Figure 1 in special cases, for example, when Ms = 0
and Mw is sufficiently large or small. The proposed bounds moreover allow to conclude the following:
• Secrecy Capacity is Always Positive: In particular, the secrecy capacity is positive even when the eavesdropper is
stronger than all the legitimate receivers with cache memories.
• The Secrecy Constraint Can Significantly Harm Capacity: The secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff can be significantly
smaller than its non-secure counterpart, especially when only weak receivers have cache memories. One explanation is
that when only weak receivers have cache memories, the communication to the strong receivers needs to be either secured
through wiretap binning or other secrecy mechanisms, which both significantly reduce the rate of communication.
• Caching Gains are More Important under a Secrecy Constraint: In the regime of small cache memories, the gains of
caching (i.e., the slope of the capacity) are more pronounced in our system with secrecy constraint than in the standard
non-secure system. Consider for example, Ms = 0 and Mw sufficiently small. In this regime, when the eavesdropper’s
erasure probability δz is larger than erasure probability at the strong receivers δs, the slope γsec of the secrecy capacity-
memory tradeoff satisfies (see Corollary 2)
γsec =
Kw(δz − δs)
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(δz − δw)+
. (2)
The slope γ of the standard non-secure capacity-memory tradeoff satisfies (see [2, Theorem 2])
γ ≤
Kw
D
. (3)
This latter slope γ thus deteriorates with increasing library size D, which is not the case for γsec. The main reason for
this behavior is that in a standard system the cache memories are filled with data, and intuitively each stored bit is useful
only under some of the demands. In a secure system, a good option is to store secret keys in the cache memories of the
receivers. These secret keys are helpful for all possible demands, and therefore the caching gain does not degrade with
the library size D.
• Optimal Cache Assignments for Small Total Cache Budgets: For small total cache budgets, the global secrecy capacity-
memory tradeoff is achieved by assigning all of the cache memory uniformly only over the weak receivers if the
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eavesdropper is weaker than strong receivers, and it is achieved by assigning all the cache memory uniformly over all
receivers, if the eavesdropper is stronger than all receivers.
Paper Organization: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II formally defines the problem. Section
III presents a general upper bound on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff and specializes it to the specific model of this
work. In Sections IV and V, we present our results for the scenarios when only weak receivers have cache memories and
when all receivers have cache memories, and we sketch the coding schemes achieving the proposed lower bounds. Section VI
contains our results on the global secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff. Sections VIII and VII describe and analyze in detail all
the coding schemes proposed in this paper. Finally, Section IX concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Channel Model
We consider a wiretap erasure BC with a single transmitter, K receivers and one eavesdropper, as shown in Figure 1. The
input alphabet of the BC is
X={0, 1} (4)
and all receivers and the eavesdropper have the same output alphabet
Z=Y=X ∪∆. (5)
The output erasure symbol ∆ indicates the loss of a bit at the receiver. Let δk be the erasure probability of Receiver k’s channel,
for k ∈ K := {1, . . . ,K}, and δz be the erasure probability of the eavesdropper’s channel. Hence, the marginal transition laws
of this BC are described by
P[Yk = yk|X = x] =


1− δk if yk = x
δk if yk = ∆ , ∀ k ∈ K
0 otherwise
(6)
and
P[Z = z|X = x] =


1− δz if z = x
δz if z = ∆
0 otherwise
(7)
with 0 ≤ δk, δz ≤ 1.
The K receivers are partitioned into two sets. The first set
Kw := {1, . . . ,Kw} (8)
is formed by Kw weak receivers which have bad channel conditions. The second set
Ks := {Kw + 1, . . . ,K} (9)
is formed by Ks = K− Kw strong receivers which have good channel conditions.
In other words, we assume that
δk =
{
δw if k ∈ Kw
δs if k ∈ Ks
(10)
with
0 ≤ δs ≤ δw ≤ 1. (11)
In a standard wiretap erasure BC, reliable communication with positive rates is only possible when the eavesdropper’s erasure
probability δz is larger than the erasure probabilities at all legitimate receivers. Here, any configuration of erasure probabilities
is possible, because the legitimate receivers can prestore information in local cache memories and this information is not
accessible by the eavesdropper. Specifically, we assume that each weak receiver has access to a local cache memory of size
nMw bits and each strong receiver has access to a local cache memory of size nMs bits.
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Fig. 1. Erasure BC with K = Kw + Ks legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper. The Kw weaker receivers have cache memories of size Mw and the Ks
stronger receivers have cache memories of size Ms. The random variable θ models a source of randomness locally available at the transmitter.
B. Library and Receiver Demands
The transmitter can access a library of D > K independent messages
W1, . . . ,WD (12)
of rate R ≥ 0 each. So for each d ∈ D,
D := {1, . . . ,D}, (13)
message Wd is uniformly distributed over the set
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋
}
, where n is the transmission blocklength.
Every receiver k ∈ K demands exactly one message Wdk from the library. We denote the demand of Receiver k by dk ∈ D
and the demand vector of all receivers by
d := (d1, . . . , dK) ∈ D
K. (14)
Communication takes place in two phases: a first caching phase where the transmitter sends caching information to be
stored in the receivers’ cache memories and the subsequent delivery phase where the demanded messages Wdk , for k ∈ K,
are conveyed to the receivers.
C. Placement Phase
The placement phase takes place during periods of low network-traffic. The transmitter therefore has all the available
resources to transmit the cached contents in an error-free and secure fashion, and this first phase is only restricted by the
storage constraints on the cache memories. However, since the caching phase takes place before the receivers demand their
files, the cached content cannot depend on the demand vector d, but only on the library and local randomness θ that is
accessible by the transmitter. The cache content Vk stored at receiver k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is thus of the form
Vk = gk (W1, . . . ,WD, θ) , (15)
for some caching function
gk :
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋
}D
×Θ→ Vi (16)
where for k ∈ Kw
Vk :=
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nMw⌋
}
, k ∈ Kw (17)
and for k ∈ Ks
Vk :=
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nMs⌋
}
, k ∈ Ks. (18)
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D. Delivery Phase
Prior to the delivery phase, the demand vector d is learned by the transmitter and the legitimate receivers. The communication
of the demand vector requires zero communication rate since it takes only K ·
⌈
log(D)
⌉
bits to describe d.
Based on the demand vector d, the transmitter sends
Xn = fd (W1, . . . ,WD, θ) , (19)
for some function
fd :
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋
}D
×Θ→ Xn. (20)
Each Receiver k ∈ K, attempts to decode its demanded message Wdk based on its observed outputs Y
n
k and its cache
content Vk:
Wˆk := ϕk,d(Y
n
k , Vk), k ∈ K, (21)
for some function
ϕk,d : Y
n × Vk →
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋
}
. (22)
E. Secrecy Capacity-Memory Tradeoff
A decoding error occurs whenever Wˆk 6= Wdk , for some k ∈ K. We consider the worst-case probability of error over all
feasible demand vectors
PWorste := max
d∈DK
P
[
K⋃
k=1
{
Wˆk 6=Wdk
}]
. (23)
The communication is considered secure if the eavesdropper’s channel outputs Zn during the delivery phase provide no
information about the entire library:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I (W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n) < ǫ. (24)
As mentioned previously, the caching phase is supposed to be kept secure from the eavesdropper. This latter thus eavesdrops
only on the delivery communication.
Definition 1. A rate-memory triple (R,Mw,Ms) is securely achievable if for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large blocklength n,
there exist caching, encoding, and decoding functions as in (16), (20), and (22) so that
PWorste ≤ ǫ and
1
n
I (W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n) < ǫ. (25)
In our previous works [15] and [16], we called this secrecy constraint a joint secrecy constraint to distinguish it from the
individual secrecy constraint in [15] where the second inequality in (25) is replaced by 1
n
I (Wdk ;Z
n) < ǫ, ∀k ∈ K.
Definition 2. Given cache memory sizes (Mw,Ms), the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff Csec(Mw,Ms) is the supremum of
all rates R so that the triple (R,Mw,Ms) is securely achievable:
Csec (Mw,Ms) := sup {R : (R,Mw,Ms) securely achievable} . (26)
Remark 1. Without cache memories, i.e., Mw = Ms = 0, the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff Csec(Mw,Ms) was determined
in [19]:
Csec (Mw = 0,Ms = 0) =
(
K∑
k=1
1
δz − δk
)−1
. (27)
For comparison, we will also be interested in the standard (non-secure) capacity-memory tradeoff C (Mw,Ms) as defined
in [3], [20]. It is the largest rate R for given cache sizes Mw and Ms that allows to find caching, encoding, and decoding
functions as in (16), (20), and (22) so that
PWorste ≤ ǫ. (28)
That means, C (Mw,Ms) differs from Csec (Mw,Ms) in that no secrecy constraint is imposed.
We start with a small section on preliminaries.
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F. Preliminaries: A Mapping and A Lemma
For fixed positive real numbers n,R′, RKey, define the mapping
sec(w, key) : ⌊2nR
′
⌋ × ⌊2nRKey⌋ → ⌊2nR
′
⌋ (29)
: (w,Key) 7→ (w + Key) mod ⌊2nR
′
⌋, (30)
where mod denotes the modulo operator. Notice that from sec(w, key) and key it is possible to recover w. Let sec−1key(·)
denote this inverse mapping so that
sec
−1
key (sec(w, key)) = w. (31)
When R′ = RKey, we also write
⊕
instead of sec:
w1
⊕
w2 := sec
(
w1, w2
)
. (32)
We mostly use sec when one of the arguments is a secret key and we use
⊕
when both arguments refer to messages.
The following lemma is key in the secrecy analysis of our schemes.
Lemma 1. Consider the rates R˜ ≥ R′ > 0 and the random codebook
C =
{
xn
′
(ℓ) : ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . , ⌊2n
′R˜⌋
}}
(33)
with entries drawn i.i.d. according to some distribution PX . Let the message W
′ be uniform over {1, . . . , ⌊2nR
′
⌋}. To encode
the message W ′ = w′, the transmitter picks uniformly at random a codeword from a predetermined subset S(w′) ⊆ C and
sends this codeword over the channel. If the cardinalities of the subsets {S(w′)} satisfy
log2 |S(w
′)| ≥ min{R′, (1− δz)}, ∀w
′ ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊2n
′R′⌋}, (34)
then
1
n′
I
(
W ′;Zn
′
|C
)
→ 0 as n′ →∞. (35)
Proof: If log2 |S(w
′)| = R′, then the message is encoded by means of a one-time pad [18] and 1
n
I(W ′;Zn
′
|C) = 0.
Otherwise, the lemma can be proved for example by following the steps in [17, Ch. 22.2], see p. 554 and Proof of Lemma 22.1.
III. UPPER BOUNDS ON SECRECY CAPACITY-MEMORY TRADEOFF
We start by presenting an upper bound on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff of a general degraded K-user BC with
arbitrary cache sizes M1, . . . ,MK at the receivers. Subsequently, we specialize this bound to the erasure BC studied in this
paper where all weak receivers and all strong receivers have equal cache sizes.
Consider an arbitrary degraded K-user discrete memoryless BC (not necessarily an erasure BC) with channel transition law
Γ(y1, . . . , yK|x). For simplicity, and because our result depends only on the conditional marginals Γ1(y1|x), . . . ,ΓK(yK|x), we
assume that the channel is physically degraded, so the Markov chain
X → YK → YK−1 → . . .→ Y1 (36)
holds. In the same spirit, we also assume that the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to some of the legitimate receivers,
and all other legitimate receivers are degraded with respect to the eavesdropper. Three scenarios can be considered:
a) The eavesdropper is degraded with respect to all legitimate receivers:
X → YK → YK−1 → . . .→ Y1 → Z. (37)
b) All legitimate receivers are degraded with respect to the eavesdropper:
X → Z → YK → YK−1 → . . .→ Y1. (38)
c) The eavesdropper is degraded with respect to the strongest K− ℓ∗ legitimate receivers, for some ℓ∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,K− 1}, and
the remaining legitimate receivers are degraded with respect to the eavesdropper:
X → YK → YK−1 → . . .→ Yℓ∗+1 → Z → Yℓ∗ → . . .→ Y1 (39)
Let each Receiver k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} have cache size Mk. The following lemma holds.
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Lemma 2 (Upper Bound for Arbitrary Degraded BCs and Cache Sizes). If a rate-memory tuple (R,M1, . . . ,MK) is securely
achievable, then for each receiver set S :=
{
j1, . . . , j|S|
}
⊆ K, there exist auxiliaries (U1, U2, . . . , U|S|, Q) so that for each
realization of Q = q the following Markov chain holds:
U1 → U2 → . . .→ U|S| → X → (Yj1 , . . . , Yj|S| , Z); (40)
and the following |S| inequalities are satisfied:
R ≤
[
I(U1;Yj1 |Q)− I(U1;Z|Q)
]+
+Mj1 , (41a)
and
kR ≤
k∑
ℓ=1
[
I(Uℓ;Yjℓ |Uℓ−1, Q)− I(Uℓ;Z|Uℓ−1, Q)
]+
+
k∑
ℓ=1
Mjℓ , k ∈ {2, . . . , |S|}, (41b)
where (·)+ := max{0, ·}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Turn back to the setup with weak and strong receivers in Figure 1. Based on the previous lemma and the upper bound
on the standard (non-secure) capacity-memory tradeoff in [20, Theorem 5], the following Theorem 1 presents two upper
bounds (Inequalities (42a) and (42b)) on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff for each choice of kw ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Kw} and
ks ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Ks}. Depending on the cache sizes Mw and Ms, a different choice of the parameters and of the bounds (42a)
or (42b) is tightest.
Theorem 1 (Upper Bound on Csec(Mw,Ms)). For each choice of kw ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Kw} and ks ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Ks}, the secrecy
capacity-memory tradeoff is upper bounded in the following two ways:2
1)
Csec(Mw,Ms) ≤ max
β∈[0,1]
min
{
β(δz − δw)
+
kw
+Mw,
β(δz − δw)
+ + (1− β)(δz − δs)
+
kw + ks
+
kwMw + ksMs
kw + ks
}
; (42a)
and
2)
Csec(Mw,Ms) ≤ min
{
min
i=1,...,kw
{(1− δw)βi + αi} , min
j=1,...,ks
{(1 − δs)βkw+j + αkw+j}
}
, (42b)
for some tuple of nonnegative real numbers β1, . . . , βkw+ks ≥ 0 summing to 1, where
αi := min
{
iMw
D− i+ 1
,
1
kw + ks − i+ 1
(
(kw + ks)(kwMw + ksMs)
D
−
i−1∑
ℓ=1
αℓ
)}
, i = 1, . . . , kw,
αkw+j := min
{
kwMw + jMs
D− kw − j + 1
,
1
ks − j + 1
(
(kw + ks)(kwMw + ksMs)
D
−
kw+j−1∑
ℓ=1
αℓ
)}
, j = 1, . . . , ks.
Proof. The first upper bound in (42a) is obtained by specializing Lemma 2 to the erasure BC in Figure 1. More specifically,
setting βj := I(Uj;X |Uj−1, Q), constraints (41) can be rewritten as:
Csec(Mw,Ms) ≤ β1(δz − δj1)
+ +Mj1 , (43a)
Csec(Mw,Ms) ≤
1
k
k∑
ℓ=1
[
βℓ(δz − δjℓ)
+ +Mjℓ
]
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}. (43b)
By well known properties on the mutual information, one finds that β1, . . . , β|S| ≥ 0 and
|S|∑
k=1
βk = I(U1, . . . , U|S|;X |Q) ≤ H(X) ≤ 1. (44)
Upper bound (42a) is now obtained by specializing (43) to one of the subsets
S = {1, . . . , kw,Kw + 1, . . . ,Kw + ks}, kw, ks > 0, (45a)
or
S = {1, . . . , kw}, (45b)
2For any finite numbers a, b, we define min{a/0, b} = b and min{a/0, b/0} = ∞. In the minimization (42b), a minimum over an empty set is defined
as +∞.
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or
S = {Kw + 1, . . . ,Kw + ks}, (45c)
and by noticing that for the subset in (45a) one can restrict to
β1 = β2 = . . . = βkw =
β
kw
(46)
and
βKw+1 = βKw+2 = . . . = βKw+ks =
1− β
ks
, (47)
for some β ∈ [0, 1]. For the subset in (45b) one can restrict to
β1 = β2 = . . . = βkw =
1
kw
, (48)
and the subset in (45c) one can restrict to
βKw+1 = βKw+2 = . . . = βKw+ks =
1
ks
. (49)
Constraint (42b) follows by ignoring the secrecy constraint and specializing [20, Theorem 5] to the erasure BC with weak
and strong receivers considered in this paper.
We simplify this upper bound for the special cases where only weak receivers have cache memories. More specifically, we
replace the upper bound in (42b), which is obtained from [20, Theorem 5], by a simpler bound that is obtained by specializing
the weaker upper bound in [3].
Corollary 1 (Upper Bound on Csec(Mw,Ms = 0)). For each choice of kw ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Kw}, the secrecy capacity-memory
tradeoff Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) is upper bounded in the following two ways:
Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) ≤
(
kw
1− δw
+
Ks
1− δs
)−1
+
kwMw
D
, (50a)
and
Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) ≤ max
β∈[0,1]
min
{
β(δz − δw)
+
kw
+Mw,
β(δz − δw)
+ + (1− β)(δz − δs)
+
kw + Ks
+
kw
kw + Ks
Mw
}
. (50b)
Proof. Constraint (50a) follows from [3] and by ignoring the secrecy constraint. Constraint (50b) is obtained by specializing
(42a) to the case when Ms = 0. We notice that in this case the constraint that (42a) generates for j = Ks is tighter than any
constraint that it generates for j < Ks. Thus, we can remove all constraints for j < Ks without affecting the result and we
retain only the constraint in (50b).
IV. RESULTS WHEN ONLY WEAK RECEIVERS HAVE CACHE MEMORIES
Consider the special case where only weak receivers have cache memories, i.e.
Ms = 0. (51)
In this case, a positive secrecy rate can only be achieved if
δz < δs. (52)
In the remainder of this section we assume that (52) holds.
A. Coding Schemes
We present four coding schemes in the order of increasing cache requirements. In the first two schemes, only random keys
are placed in the cache memories. The third and fourth schemes also place parts of the messages in the cache memories and
apply joint cache-channel coding for the delivery communication where the decoding operations at the receivers adapt at the
same time to the channel statistics and the cache contents. For simplicity, and because on an erasure BC time-sharing is optimal
to send independent messages to the various receivers, in some of our schemes communication is divided into subphases. When
applied to general discrete memoryless BCs, the schemes can be improved by superposing various subphases on each other.
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1) Wiretap and Cached Keys:
Placement phase: Store an independent secret key Ki in Receiver i’s cache memory, for i ∈ Kw.
Cache at Rx 1
K1
Cache at Rx 2
K2
Cache at Rx 3
K3
Cache at RxKw
KKw
Delivery phase: Time-sharing is applied over two subphases, where transmission in the first subphase is to all the weak
receivers and transmission in the second subphase is to all strong receivers. In Subphase 1, the transmitter uses a standard
(non-secure) broadcast code to send the secured message tuple
Wsec :=
(
sec
(
Wd1 ,K1
)
, sec
(
Wd2 ,K2
)
, sec
(
Wd3 ,K3
)
, . . . , sec
(
WdKw ,KKw
))
, (53)
to weak receivers 1, . . . ,Kw, respectively. With the secret key Ki stored in its cache memory, each weak receiver i ∈ Kw can
then recover a guess of its desired message Wdi . In Subphase 2, the transmitter uses a wiretap broadcast code [19] to send
messages WdKw+1 , . . . ,WdK to the strong receivers Kw + 1, . . . ,K, respectively.
For a detailed analysis, see Section VII-A.
2) Cache-Aided Superposition Jamming:
Placement phase: As in the previous subsection, store an independent secret key Ki in Receiver i’s cache memory, for
i ∈ Kw.
Cache at Rx 1
K1
Cache at Rx 2
K2
Cache at Rx 3
K3
Cache at RxKw
KKw
Delivery phase: The transmitter uses a superposition code to send the secured message tuple
Wsec :=
(
sec
(
Wd1 ,K1
)
, sec
(
Wd2 ,K2
)
, sec
(
Wd3 ,K3
)
, . . . , sec
(
WdKw ,KKw
))
, (54)
in the cloud center and the non-secure message tuple
Wsat :=
(
WdKw+1 , . . . ,WdK
)
(55)
in the satellite. If the rate of the cloud messages (54) does not suffice to secure the satellite message, random binning is added
to the satellite codebook. See Figure 2. Weak receivers decode only the cloud center and strong receivers the cloud center
Cloud center Satellite
Wsec = 2
Wsat = 5
bin corresponding to
(Wsec = 2,Wsat = 5)
Fig. 2. Superposition codebook with random binning in the satellites.
and the satellite codeword. From this decoding operation, each strong receiver j ∈ Ks directly obtains a guess of Wdj . Each
weak receiver i ∈ Kw uses the secret key Ki stored in its cache memory to recover a guess of its intended message Wdi .
Section VII-B presents the details of the scheme and its analysis.
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3) Secure Cache-Aided Piggyback Coding I:
The scheme builds on the nested piggyback coding scheme in [3], which is rendered secure by applying secret keys to the
produced XOR-messages and by introducing wiretap binning. During the placement phase, each of these secret keys is stored
in the cache memories of the weak receivers that decode the corresponding XOR-message. We outline the scheme for Kw = 3
weak receivers and Ks = 1 strong receiver.
Divide each message Wd into six submessages
Wd =
(
W
(A)
d,{1},W
(A)
d,{2},W
(A)
d,{3},W
(B)
d,{1,2},W
(B)
d,{1,3},W
(B)
d,{2,3}
)
, d ∈ D, (56)
where the first three are of equal rate and the latter three are of equal rate. Let K{1,2,3}, K{1,2},K{2,3},K{1,3} be independent
secret keys generated at the transmitter.
Placement phase: Placement is as described in the following table:
Cache at Rx 1{
W
(A)
d,{1}
}D
d=1{
W
(B)
d,{1,2},W
(B)
d,{1,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
K{1,2},K{1,3}
Cache at Rx 2{
W
(A)
d,{2}
}D
d=1{
W
(B)
d,{1,2},W
(B)
d,{2,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
K{1,2},K{2,3}
Cache at Rx 3{
W
(A)
d,{3}
}D
d=1{
W
(B)
d,{1,3},W
(B)
d,{2,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
K{1,3},K{2,3}
Delivery phase: Time-sharing is applied over three subphases and Subphase 2 is further divided into 3 periods.
In Subphase 1, the secured message
sec
(
W
(B)
d1,{2,3}
⊕W
(B)
d2,{1,3}
⊕W
(B)
d3,{1,2}
, K{1,2,3}
)
(57)
is sent to all three weak receivers using a standard point-to-point code. With their cache contents, each weak receiver i can
decode the submessage of Wdi sent in this subphase. Communication is secured when the key K{1,2,3} is sufficiently long. In
Subphase 3, the non-secure message W
(A)
d4
is sent to the strong receiver 4 using a standard wiretap code.
In the first period of Subphase 2, the transmitter uses the secure piggyback codebook in Figure 3 to transmit the secure
message
W
(A)
sec,{1,2} = sec
(
W
(A)
d1,{2}
⊕W
(A)
d2,{1}
, K{1,2}
)
(58)
to Receivers 1 and 2 and the non-secure message W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
to Receiver 4. It randomly chooses a codeword in the wiretap bin
indicated by Wsec,{1,2} and W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
and sends the chosen codeword over the channel. Weak receivers 1 and 2 have stored
W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
in their cache memories and can decode based on a restricted codebook consisting only of the bins in the column
indicated by W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
. Their decoding performance is thus the same as if this message W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
had not been sent at all.
The strong receiver 4 has no cache memory and decodes both messages based on the entire codebook. Notice that the secured
message Wsec,{1,2} also acts as random wiretap binning to secure message W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
to Receiver 4. If this binning suffices to
secure W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
, then no additional random binning is needed, i.e., the magenta bin in Figure 3 can be chosen of size 1.
Similar secure piggyback codebooks are also used during the second and third periods of Subphase 2 to send messages
sec
(
W
(A)
d1,{3}
⊕W
(A)
d3,{1}
, K{1,3}
)
and Wd4,{1,3} and messages sec
(
W
(A)
d2,{3}
⊕W
(A)
d3,{2}
, K{2,3}
)
and Wd4,{2,3}, respectively.
At the end of the delivery phase, each Receiver k ∈ K assembles all the guesses pertaining to its desired message Wdk and
(in case of the weak receivers) all the parts of this message stored in its cache memory to form the final guess Wˆk.
Remark 2. The secure piggyback codebook used in Subphase 2 is inspired by the non-secure piggyback coding and Tuncel
coding in [3] and [21], and by the secure coding scheme for BCs with complementary side-information in [22]. In fact, the
main difference to the scheme in [22] is that here one of the receivers and the transmitter share a common secret key, which
allows to reduce the size of the wiretap bins or even eliminate them completely.
Interestingly, in this construction, the secret key K{1,2},K{1,3},K{2,3} stored at the weak receivers allow to “remotely
secure” the transmission from the transmitter to the strong receiver 4.
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W
(A)
sec,{1,2}
W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
Wiretap bin corresponding
to
(
W
(A)
sec,{1,2},W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
)
Fig. 3. Secure piggyback codebook with subcodebooks arranged in an array. Dots indicate codewords.
4) Secure Cache-Aided Piggyback Coding II:
This scheme is similar to the scheme in the previous section, but simpler. Divide each message Wd into 2 submessages
Wd = (W
(A)
d ,W
(B)
d ) and let K1, . . . ,KKw be independent secret keys.
Placement phase: Placement is as depicted in the following. In particular, each weak receiver i ∈ Kw caches the secret key
Ki and all submessages W
(B)
d , for d ∈ D.
Cache at Rx 1{
W
(B)
d
}D
d=1
K1
Cache at Rx 2{
W
(B)
d
}D
d=1
K2
Cache at Rx 3{
W
(B)
d
}D
d=1
K3
Cache at RxKw{
W
(B)
d
}D
d=1
KKw
Delivery phase: Transmission is in two subphases. In Subphase 1, the secure piggyback codebook is used to send the secured
message tuple
W
(A)
sec,w :=
(
sec
(
W
(A)
d1
,K1
)
, . . . , sec
(
W
(A)
dKw
,KKw
))
(59)
to all weak receivers and the non-secure message tuple
W
(B)
s :=
(
W
(B)
dKw+1
, . . . , W
(B)
dK
)
(60)
to the strong receivers. The codebook is depicted in Figure 3 where W
(A)
sec,{1,2} needs to be replaced by W
(A)
sec,w and W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
by W
(B)
s . The weak receivers can reconstruct W
(B)
s from their cache contents, and thus decode their desired message tuple
W
(A)
sec,w based on the single column of the codebook indicated by W
(B)
s . From this decoded tuple and the secret key Ki stored
in its cache memory, each weak receiver i ∈ Kw can then produce a guess of its desired message part W
(A)
di
. The strong
receivers decode both message tuples W
(A)
sec,w and W
(B)
s . Strong receiver j ∈ Ks keeps only its guess of W
(B)
dj
and discards
the rest.
Communication in this first subphase is secured because messages W
(A)
d1
, . . . ,W
(A)
dKw
are perfectly secured by one-time pads
and these one-time pads act as random bin indices to protect the messages W
(B)
dKw+1
, . . . ,W
(B)
dK
as in wiretap coding.
In Subphase 2, the message tuple
W
(A)
s =
(
W
(A)
dKw+1
, . . . , W
(A)
dK
)
(61)
is sent to all the strong receivers using a point-to-point wiretap code.
The choice of the rates and the lengths of the subphases are explained in Section VII-D, where the scheme is also analyzed.
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B. Results on the Secrecy Capacity-Memory Tradeoff
Consider the following Kw + 4 rate-memory pairs:
• R(0) :=
(δz − δs)(δz − δw)
+
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(δz − δw)+
, (62a)
M
(0) := 0; (62b)
• R(1) :=
(1− δw)(δz − δs)
Ks(1− δw) + Kw(δz − δs)
, (62c)
M
(1) :=
(δz − δs)min
{
1− δz, 1− δw
}
Ks(1− δw) + Kw(δz − δs)
; (62d)
• R(2) := min
{
(1 − δw)(1 − δs)
Ks(1 − δw) + Kw(1 − δs)
,
(1− δw)(δz − δs)
Ks(1 − δw) + Kw(δw − δs)
}
, (62e)
M
(2) := min
{
1− δz
Kw
,
(1− δw)(δz − δs)
Ks(1 − δw) + Kw(δw − δs)
}
; (62f)
• For t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}
R(t+2) :=
(t+ 1)(1 − δw)(δz − δs)
[
Kst(1− δw) + (Kw − t+ 1)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
(Kw− t+ 1)(δz − δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)+(Kw− t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
, (62g)
M
(t+2) :=
D · t(t+ 1)(1 − δw)(δz − δs)
[
Ks(t− 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t+ 1)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
Kw
[
(Kw− t+ 1)(δz − δs)[Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)+(Kw− t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}]+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
]
+
(t+ 1)(Kw − t+ 1)(δz − δs)min {1− δz , 1− δw}
[
Kst(1− δw) + (Kw − t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
Kw
[
(Kw− t+ 1)(δz − δs)[Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)+(Kw− t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}]+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
] ; (62h)
• R(Kw+2) :=
δz − δs
Ks
, (62i)
M
(Kw+2) :=
D · Kw(δz − δs)
2 + Ks(δz − δs)min {1− δz, 1− δw}
Ks
[
Ksmin{1− δz , 1− δw}+ Kw(δz − δs)
] ; (62j)
• R(Kw+3) :=
δz − δs
Ks
, (62k)
M
(Kw+3) :=
D · (δz − δs)
Ks
. (62l)
Theorem 2 (Lower Bound on Csec(Mw,Ms = 0)).
Csec (Mw,Ms = 0) ≥ upper hull
{(
R(ℓ),M(ℓ)
)
: ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,Kw + 3}
}
. (63)
Proof. It suffices to prove achievability of the Kw+4 rate-memory pairs {(R
(ℓ),M(ℓ)) : ℓ = 0, . . . ,Kw+3}. Achievability of
the upper convex hull follows by time/memory sharing arguments as in [1]. The pair (R(0),M(0)) is achievable by Remark 1.
The pair (R(1),M(1)) is achieved by the “wiretap and cached keys” scheme described and analyzed in Sections IV-A1 and
VII-A. The pair (R(2),M(2)) is achieved by the “cache-aided superposition jamming” scheme described and analyzed in
Sections IV-A2 and VII-B. The pairs (R(t+2),M(t+2)), for t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}, are achieved by the “secure cache-aided
piggyback coding I” scheme described and analyzed in Sections IV-A3 and VII-C. The pair (R(Kw+2),M(Kw+2)) is achieved
by the “secure cache-aided piggyback coding II” scheme described and analyzed in Sections IV-A4 and VII-D. The pair
(R(Kw+3),M(Kw+3)) is achieved by storing the entire library in the cache memory of each weak receiver and by applying a
standard wiretap BC code [19] to send the requested messages to the strong receivers.
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Interestingly, upper and lower bounds in Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 match for small and large Mw irrespective of the
number of weak and strong receivers Kw and Ks. In the absence of a secrecy constraint, the best upper and lower bounds for
small Mw match only when Kw = 1, irrespective of the value of Ks [3], [5].
Corollary 2. When the cache memory Mw is small:
Csec (Mw,Ms = 0) = R
(0) +
Kw(δz − δs)
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(δz − δw)+
Mw, 0 ≤ Mw ≤ M
(1), (64)
where R(0) is defined in (62a) and M(1) is defined in (62d).
Proof: Achievability follows from the two achievable rate-memory pairs (R(0),M(0)) and (R(1),M(1)) in (62a)–(62d)
and by time/memory-sharing arguments. The converse follows from upper bound (50b) in Corollary 1 when specialized to
kw = Kw. In fact, for kw = Kw and cache size Mw ∈ [0,M
(1)], the maximizing β is:
β =
(δz − δs)− KsMw
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(δz − δw)+
Kw. (65)
This choice of β makes the two terms in the minimization (50b) equal.
Notice that when δz ≤ δw, then (64) specializes to
Csec (Mw,Ms = 0) = Mw. (66)
The secrecy capacity thus grows in the same way as the cache size at weak receivers. This is achieved by the scheme we
termed cache-aided wiretap coding with secret keys.
Notice that in this case the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff Csec (Mw,Ms = 0) grows much faster in the cache size Mw
than its non-secure counterpart C(Mw,Ms = 0). In fact, by the upper bound in [3], the maximum slope of the standard
capacity-memory tradeoff
γ := max
m≥0
{
dC(Mw,Ms = 0)
dMw
∣∣∣∣∣
Mw=m
}
(67)
is at most
γ ≤
KwMw
D
. (68)
By the above Corollary 2 and the concavity of Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) in Mw, the maximum slope of the secrecy capacity-memory
tradeoff
γsec := max
m≥0
{
dCsec(Mw,Ms = 0)
dMw
∣∣∣∣∣
Mw=m
}
(69)
is
γsec = lim
m→0
{
dCsec(Mw,Ms = 0)
dMw
∣∣∣∣∣
Mw=m
}
=
Kw(δz − δs)
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(δz − δw)+
Mw. (70)
So in contrast to the maximum slope of the standard capacity-memory tradeoff γ, the maximum slope of the secrecy capacity-
memory tradeoff γsec does not deteriorate with the size of the library D. The reason for this discrepancy is that in the setup
with secrecy constraint an optimal strategy for small cache memories is to exclusively place secret keys in the cache memories.
In this case, each bit of the cache content is useful irrespective of the specifically demanded files. In a setup without secrecy
constraint, only data is placed in the cache memories. So, at least on an intuitive level, each bit of cache memory is useful
only under some of the demands.
We turn to the regime of large cache memories.
Corollary 3. When the cache memory Mw is large:
Csec (Mw,Ms = 0) =
δz − δs
Ks
, Mw ≥ M
(Kw+2), (71)
where M(Kw+2) is defined in (62j).
The rate-memory pairs (62g)–(62j) are attained by means of joint cache-channel coding where the decoders simultaneously
adapt to the cache contents and the channel statistics. To emphasize the strength of the joint coding approach, we characterize
the rates that are securely achievable under a separate cache-channel coding approach.
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Mw
C
se
c
(M
w
,M
s
=
0
)
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
UB on Csec(Mw, 0)
LB on Csec(Mw, 0) using joint coding
LB on Csec(Mw, 0) using separate coding
LB on C(Mw, 0)(a)
(b)
(c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 4. Upper and lower bounds on Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) for δw = 0.7, δs = 0.3, δz = 0.8, D = 30, Kw = 5, and Ks = 15.
For t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}, define the following rate-memory pairs:
R(t)sep :=
(t+ 1)(1 − δw)(δz − δs)
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t)(δz − δs)
, (72a)
M
(t)
sep :=
D · t(t+ 1)(1− δw)(δz − δs) + (t+ 1)(Kw − t)(δz − δs)min{1− δz, 1− δw}
Kw
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t)(δz − δs)
] . (72b)
Proposition 1. Any rate R > 0 is achievable by means of separate cache-channel coding, if it satisfies
R < upper hull
{(
R(ℓ),M(ℓ)
)
,
(
R(t)sep,M
(t)
sep
)
: ℓ ∈ {0, 1, 2,Kw + 3} and t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}
}
. (73)
Proof: The rate-memory tuples
{ (
R(ℓ),M(ℓ)
)
: ℓ = 0, 1, 2,Kw + 3
}
in (62a)–(62f) and (62k)–(62l) are achieved by
the schemes in Subsections IV-A1 and IV-A2. It can be verified that these schemes apply a separate cache-channel coding
architecture. Rate-memory pairs
{(
R
(t)
sep,M
(t)
sep
)
: t = 1, . . . ,Kw− 1
}
are achieved by a scheme that communicates to weak and
strong receivers in two independent phases: in the first phase it combines the Sengupta secure coded caching scheme [6] with
a standard optimal BC code to communicate to the weak receivers, and in the second phase it applies a standard wiretap BC
code to communicate to the strong receivers.
C. Numerical Comparisons
In Figure 4, we compare the presented bounds at hand of an example with 5 weak and 15 strong receivers and where
the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to all receivers. The figure shows the upper and lower bounds on the secrecy
capacity-memory tradeoff Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) in Corollary 1 and Theorem 2. It also shows the rates achieved by the separate
cache-channel coding scheme leading to Proposition 1. Finally, the figure presents the lower bound on the standard capacity-
memory tradeoff in [3].
The presented lower bound of Theorem 2 (see the black solid line in Figure 4) is piece-wise linear with the end points of
the pieces corresponding to the points in (62). The left-most point (a) corresponds to the capacity in the absence of cache
memories. The second and third left-most points (b) and (c) are obtained by storing only secret keys in the cache memories.
The right-most point (e) corresponds to the point where the messages can be sent at the same rate as if only strong receivers
were present in the system. This performance is trivially achieved by storing all messages in each of the weak receivers’ cache
memories and holding the delivery communication only to strong receivers. After this point, the capacity cannot be increased
14
Mw
C
se
c
(M
w
,M
s
=
0
)
0
0
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
UB on Csec(Mw, 0)
LB on Csec(Mw, 0) using joint coding
LB on Csec(Mw, 0) using separate coding
Fig. 5. Upper and lower bounds on Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) for δw = 0.8, δs = 0.3, δz = 0.6, D = 30, Kw = 5, and Ks = 15.
further because strong receivers do not have cache memories. Through coding, the same rate can also be achieved without
storing the entire library at each weak receiver, see the second right-most point (d).
For small and large cache memories, our upper and lower bounds are exact. This shows that in the regime of small
cache memories, it is optimal to place only secret keys in the weak receivers’ cache memories. In this regime, the slope of
Csec(Mw,Ms = 0) in Mw is steep (see Corollary 2 and Equation (70)) because the secret keys stored in the cache memories
are always helpful, irrespective of the specific demands d. In particular, the slope is not divided by the library size D as is the
case in the traditional caching setup without secrecy constraint.
In the regime of moderate or large cache memories, the proposed placement strategies also store information about the
messages in the cache memories. In this regime, the slope Csec is smaller and proportional to
1
D
, because only a fraction of
the cache content is effectively helpful for a specific demand d.
Figure 5 shows the bounds for an example where the eavesdropper is stronger than the weak receivers but not the strong
receivers:
δs < δz < δw. (74)
It shows that positive rates can be achieved even if δz ≤ δw, because messages sent to weak receivers can be specially secured
by means of one-time pads using the secret keys stored in their cache memories.
V. RESULTS WHEN ALL RECEIVERS HAVE CACHE MEMORIES
We turn to the case where all receivers have cache memories, so Mw,Ms > 0. In this case, we do not impose any constraint
on the eavesdropper’s channel, so δz can be larger or smaller than δs, δw.
A. Coding Schemes
We present four coding schemes. The first one only stores secret keys in all the cache memories, the second one stores keys
in all cache memories and data at weak receivers, and the last two schemes store keys and data at all the receivers.
1) Cached Keys:
Placement phase: Store independent secret keys K1, . . . ,KK in the cache memories of Receivers 1, . . . ,K:
Cache at Rx 1
K1
Cache at Rx 2
K2
Cache at Rx 3
K3
Cache at RxK
KK
Delivery phase: Apply a standard (non-secure) broadcast code to send the secured message tuple
Wsec :=
(
sec
(
Wd1 ,K1
)
, sec
(
Wd2 ,K2
)
, sec
(
Wd3 ,K3
)
, . . . , sec
(
WdK ,KK
))
, (75)
to Receivers 1, . . . ,K, respectively. With the secret key Kk stored in its cache memory, each Receiver k ∈ K recovers a guess
of its desired message Wdk . See Section VIII-A on how to choose the parameters of the scheme.
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2) Secure Cache-Aided Piggyback Coding with Keys at All Receivers:
The difference between this scheme and the secure cache-aided piggyback coding scheme of Sections IV-A3 and VII-C is that
additional secret keys are placed in the cache memories of weak and strong receivers so that communications in Subphases 2
and 3 can entirely be secured with these keys, i.e., no wiretap binning is required.
We outline the scheme for Kw = 3 weak receivers and Ks = 1 strong receiver. For a detailed description and an analysis in
the general case, see Section VIII-B.
Divide each message Wd into six submessages
Wd =
(
W
(A)
d,{1},W
(A)
d,{2},W
(A)
d,{3},W
(B)
d,{1,2},W
(B)
d,{1,3},W
(B)
d,{2,3}
)
, d ∈ D, (76)
where the first three are of equal rate and the latter three are of equal rate.
Placement phase: Placement is as described in the following table, where K{1,2,3}, K{1,2}, K{2,3}, K{1,3}, K4,{1,2},
K4,{2,3}, K4,{1,3}, K{4} denote independent secret keys.
Cache at Rx1{
W
(A)
d,{1}
}D
d=1{
W
(B)
d,{1,2},W
(B)
d,{1,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
K{1,2},K{1,3}
K4,{1,2},K4,{1,3}
Cache at Rx2{
W
(A)
d,{2}
}D
d=1{
W
(B)
d,{1,2},W
(B)
d,{2,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
K{1,2},K{2,3}
K4,{1,2},K4,{2,3}
Cache at Rx3{
W
(A)
d,{3}
}D
d=1{
W
(B)
d,{1,3},W
(B)
d,{2,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
K{1,3},K{2,3}
K4,{1,3},K4,{2,3}
Cache at Rx4
K4
K4,{1,2}
K4,{1,3}
K4,{2,3}
Delivery phase: Time-sharing is applied over three subphases and Subphase 2 is further divided into 3 periods.
Transmission in Subphase 1 is as described in Section IV-A3. In Subphase 3, the secured message sec
(
W
(A)
d4
,K4
)
is sent
to the strong receiver 4 using a standard point-to-point code. This transmission is secure if the key K4 is chosen sufficiently
long.
In the first period of Subphase 2, the transmitter uses the standard piggyback codebook in Figure 6 to transmit the secure
message
W
(A)
sec,{1,2} = sec
(
W
(A)
d1,{2}
⊕W
(A)
d2,{1}
, K{1,2}
)
(77)
to Receivers 1 and 2 and the secure message
W
(B)
sec,{4} = sec
(
W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
,K4,{1,2}
)
(78)
to Receiver 4. Receivers 1 and 2 can reconstruct W
(A)
sec,{4} from their cache contents, and thus decode message W
(A)
sec,{1,2}
based solely on the column of the codebook that corresponds to W
(B)
sec,{4}. Receiver 4 decodes both messages W
(A)
sec,{1,2} and
W
(B)
sec,{4}. From the decoded secured messages and the keys stored in their cache memories, Receivers 1, 2, and 4 can recover
their desired message parts W
(A)
d1,{2}
,W
(A)
d2,{1}
and W
(B)
d4,{1,2}
.
In the same way, using a standard piggyback codebook, the secured messages sec
(
W
(A)
d1,{3}
⊕ W
(A)
d3,{1}
, K{1,3}
)
and
sec
(
W
(B)
d4,{1,3}
,K4,{1,3}
)
are transmitted in Period 2 to Receivers 1, 3, and 4, and the secured messages sec
(
W
(A)
d2,{3}
⊕
W
(A)
d3,{2}
, K{2,3}
)
and sec
(
W
(B)
d4,{2,3}
,K4,{2,3}
)
are transmitted in Period 3 to Receivers 2, 3, and 4.
3) Symmetric Secure Piggyback Coding:
Each message is split into two submessages Wd = (W
(A)
d ,W
(B)
d ), and communication is in three subphases. Submessages
of {W
(A)
d } and corresponding secret keys are placed in weak receivers’ cache memories according to the Sengupta et al.
secure coded caching placement algorithm [6]. Submessages of {W
(B)
d } and corresponding secret keys are placed in strong
receivers’ cache memories according to the same placement algorithm. In Subphase 1, the Sengupta et al. delivery scheme
for submessages {W
(A)
d } is combined with a standard BC code to transmit only to weak receivers and in Subphase 3 it is
combined with a standard BC code to transmit only to strong receivers. Transmission in Subphase 2 is divided into into KwKs
periods, each dedicated to a pair of weak and strong receivers i ∈ Kw and j ∈ Ks. A standard piggyback codebook is used in
each of these periods to send secured messages to the corresponding pair of receivers. The secret keys securing these messages
have been pre-placed in the appropriate cache memories.
We now describe the scheme in more detail for the special case Kw = 3 and Ks = 2, and for parameters tw = 2 and ts = 1.
The general scheme is described and analyzed in Section VIII-C.
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W
(A)
sec,{1,2}
W
(B)
sec,{4}
Codeword corresponding
to
(
W
(A)
sec,{1,2},W
(B)
sec,{4}
)
Fig. 6. Standard piggyback codebook where only a single codeword (indicated by a single dot) is assigned to each pair of messages.
Divide each Wd into six submessages
Wd =
(
W
(A)
d,{1,2},W
(A)
d,{1,3},W
(A)
d,{2,3},W
(B)
d,{4},W
(B)
d,{5}
)
, d ∈ D, (79)
where the first three are of equal rate and the latter two are of equal rate.
Placement phase: Generate independent secret keys K{1,2,3}, Kw,{1,4}, Kw,{1,5}, Kw,{2,4}, Kw,{2,5}, Kw,{3,4}, Kw,{3,5},
Ks,{1,4}, Ks,{1,5}, Ks,{2,4}, Ks,{2,5}, Ks,{3,4}, Ks,{3,5}, K{4,5}.
Placement of information in the cache memories is as indicated in the following table.
Cache at Rx1{
W
(A)
d,{1,2},W
(A)
d,{1,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
Kw,{1,4},Kw,{1,5}
Ks,{1,4},Ks,{1,5}
Cache at Rx2{
W
(A)
d,{1,2},W
(A)
d,{2,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
Kw,{2,4},Kw,{2,5}
Ks,{2,4},Ks,{2,5}
Cache at Rx3{
W
(A)
d,{1,3},W
(A)
d,{2,3}
}D
d=1
K{1,2,3}
Kw,{3,4},Kw,{3,5}
Ks,{3,4},Ks,{3,5}
Cache at Rx4{
W
(B)
d,{4}
}D
d=1
Kw,{1,4},Kw,{2,4},Kw,{3,4}
Ks,{1,4},Ks,{2,4},Ks,{3,4}
K{4,5}
Cache at Rx5{
W
(B)
d,{5}
}D
d=1
Kw,{1,5},Kw,{2,5},Kw,{3,5}
Ks,{1,5},Ks,{2,5},Ks,{3,5}
K{4,5}
Delivery phase: The delivery phase is divided into three subphases, where Subphase 2 is further divided into 6 periods.
Subphase 1 is intended only for weak receivers. The transmitter sends the secured message
W
(A)
sec,{1,2,3} = sec
(
W
(A)
d1,{2,3}
⊕W
(A)
d2,{1,3}
⊕W
(A)
d3,{1,2}
, K{1,2,3}
)
(80)
using a capacity-achieving code to the weak receivers 1, 2, and 3. With their cache contents, each of these weak receivers can
decode its desired submessage.
The first period of Subphase 2 is dedicated to Receivers 1 and 4. The transmitter sends the secured messages
W
(B)
sec,1,4 = sec
(
W
(B)
d1,{4}
,Kw,{1,4}
)
(81)
and
W
(A)
sec,4,1 = sec
(
W
(A)
d4,{1,2}
,Ks,{1,4}
)
(82)
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using a standard piggyback codebook where rows encode W
(B)
sec,1,4 and columns encode W
(A)
sec,4,1. (This corresponds to the
piggyback codebook in Figure 6 where W
(A)
sec,{1,2} needs to be replaced byW
(B)
sec,1,4 and W
(B)
sec,{4}by W
(A)
sec,4,1.) Since Receiver 1
can reconstruct W
(A)
sec,4,1 from its cache content, it decodes W
(B)
sec,1,4 based on the single column of the piggyback codebook
indicated by W
(A)
sec,4,1. Similarly, since Receiver 4 can reconstruct W
(B)
sec,1,4 from its cache content, it decodes W
(A)
sec,4,1 based
on the single row corresponding to W
(B)
sec,1,4. With their decoded secure messages and the secret keys in their cache memories,
Receiver 1 can recover W
(B)
d1,{4}
and Receiver 4 can recover W
(A)
d4,{1,2}
.
A similar scheme is used in the subsequent periods to convey the parts W
(B)
d1
,W
(B)
d2
, W
(B)
d3
, W
(A)
d4
, W
(A)
d5
that are not stored
in their cache memories to Receivers 1–5. Table I shows the concerned receivers, the conveyed messages and the keys used
in each period of Subphase 2.
TABLE I
MESSAGES SENT AND KEYS USED IN THE SIX PERIODS OF SUBPHASE 2 FOR THE EXAMPLE WITH Kw = 3 WEAK RECEIVERS AND Ks = 2 STRONG
RECEIVERS.
Subphase 2
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
Receivers 1, 4 2, 4 3, 4 1, 5 2, 5 3, 5
Keys Kw,{1,4}, Ks,{1,4} Kw,{2,4},Ks,{2,4} Kw,{3,4},Ks,{3,4} Kw,{1,5},Ks,{1,5} Kw,{2,5}, Ks,{2,5} Kw,{3,5}, Ks,{3,5}
Messages for
weak receivers
W
(B)
d1,{4}
W
(B)
d2,{4}
W
(B)
d3,{4}
W
(B)
d1,{5}
W
(B)
d2,{5}
W
(B)
d3,{5}
Messages for
strong receivers
W
(A)
d4,{1,2}
W
(A)
d4,{2,3}
W
(A)
d4,{1,3}
W
(A)
d5,{1,2}
W
(A)
d5,{2,3}
W
(A)
d5,{1,3}
Subphase 3: The transmitter sends
W
(B)
sec,{4,5} = sec
(
W
(B)
d4,{5}
⊕W
(B)
d5,{4}
, K{4,5}
)
(83)
using a capacity-achieving code to the strong receivers 4 and 5. With their cache contents, each receiver can decode its desired
submessage sent in this subphase.
Choosing all keys sufficiently long ensures that the delivery communication satisfies the secrecy constraint (24).
4) Secure Generalized Coded Caching:
The scheme is based on the generalized coded caching algorithms of [20], but where the produced zero-padded XORs are
secured with independent secret keys and these keys are placed in the cache memories of the receivers that decode the XORs.
Choosing the secret keys sufficient long, ensures than the secrecy constraint (24) is satisfied.
B. Results on the Secrecy Capacity-Memory Tradeoff
Consider the following K+ Kw + KwKs rate-memory tuples. Let R˜
(0) = R(0) and M˜
(0)
w = M˜
(0)
s = 0.
• Let
R˜(1) :=
(1− δs)(1 − δw)
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1− δw)
, (84a)
M˜
(1)
w :=
(1− δs)min
{
1− δz, 1− δw
}
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1 − δw)
, (84b)
M˜
(1)
s :=
(1− δw)min
{
1− δz, 1− δs
}
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1 − δw)
; (84c)
• For t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}, let
R˜(t+1) :=
(t+ 1)(1− δw)(1 − δs)
[
Kst(1 − δw) + (Kw − t+ 1)(δw − δs)
]
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1 − δw) + (Kw − t)(δw − δs)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
, (84d)
M˜
(t+1)
w :=
D · t(t+ 1)(1− δw)(1 − δs)
[
Ks(t− 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t+ 1)(δw − δs)
]
Kw
[
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)[Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t)(δw − δs)] + K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
]
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+
Kst(t+ 1)(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δw)(1 − δs)min{1− δz, 1− δs}
Kw
[
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)[Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t)(δw − δs)] + K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
]
+
(t+ 1)(Kw − t)(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)(δw − δs)min {1− δz , 1− δw}
]
Kw
[
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)[Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t)(δw − δs)] + K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
] , (84e)
M˜
(t+1)
s :=
Kst(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2 min {1− δz , 1− δs}
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1 − δw) + (Kw − t)(δw − δs)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
+
(t+ 1)(Kw − t+ 1)(1 − δw)(1 − δs)min {(δw − δz)
+, δw − δs}
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw) + (Kw − t)(δw − δs)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
; (84f)
• For each pair tw ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw} and ts ∈ {1, . . . ,Ks}, let
R˜(Kw+(tw−1)Ks+ts) :=
(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δw)(1− δs)
[
Ks(1− δw) + Kw(1− δs)
]
Kw(Kw− tw)(ts+ 1)(1− δs)2+Ks(tw+ 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks− ts)(1− δw)+Kw(ts+ 1)(1− δs)
] ,
(84g)
M˜
(Kw+(tw−1)Ks+ts)
w :=
(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δs)
2
[
D · tw(1− δw) + (Kw − tw)min {1− δz, 1− δw}
]
Kw(Kw− tw)(ts+ 1)(1− δs)2+Ks(tw+ 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks− ts)(1− δw)+Kw(ts+ 1)(1− δs)
]
+
Ks(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δw)(1− δs)min {1− δz, 2− δw − δs}
Kw(Kw− tw)(ts+ 1)(1− δs)2+Ks(tw+ 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks− ts)(1 − δw)+Kw(ts+ 1)(1− δs)
] ,
(84h)
M˜
(Kw+(tw−1)Ks+ts)
s :=
(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δw)
2
[
D · ts(1− δs) + (Ks − ts)min {1− δz, 1− δs}
]
Kw(Kw− tw)(ts+ 1)(1− δs)2+Ks(tw+ 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks− ts)(1− δw)+Kw(ts+ 1)(1− δs)
]
+
Kw(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δw)(1− δs)min {1− δz , 2− δw − δs}
Kw(Kw− tw)(ts+ 1)(1− δs)2+Ks(tw+ 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks− ts)(1 − δw)+Kw(ts+ 1)(1− δs)
] ;
(84i)
• For t ∈ {1, . . . ,K− 1}, let
R˜(Kw+KwKs+t) :=
∑min{t,Kw}
tw=max{0,t−Ks}
(
Kw
tw
)(
Ks
t−tw
)
(1− δw)
−tw (1− δs)
tw∑min{t+1,Kw}
tw=max{0,t+1−Ks}
(
Kw
tw
)(
Ks
t+1−tw
)
(1− δw)−tw(1− δs)tw−1
, (84j)
M˜
(Kw+KwKs+t)
w :=
D ·
∑min{t,Kw}
tw=max{1,t−Ks}
(
Kw−1
tw−1
)(
Ks
t−tw
)
(1− δw)
−tw (1− δs)
tw∑min{t+1,Kw}
tw=max{0,t+1−Ks}
(
Kw
tw
)(
Ks
t+1−tw
)
(1− δw)−tw(1− δs)tw−1
+min

 (t+ 1)(1− δz)K ,
(1− δw)
−tw(1− δs)
tw
[(
K−1
t
)
(1 − δs)−
(
Kw−1
t
)
(δw − δs)
]
∑min{t+1,Kw}
tw=max{0,t+1−Ks}
(
Kw
tw
)(
Ks
t+1−tw
)
(1 − δw)−tw (1− δs)tw

 , (84k)
M˜
(Kw+KwKs+t)
s :=
D ·
∑min{t−1,Kw}
tw=max{0,t−Ks}
(
Kw
tw
)(
Ks−1
t−tw−1
)
(1− δw)
−tw (1− δs)
tw∑min{t+1,Kw}
tw=max{0,t+1−Ks}
(
Kw
tw
)(
Ks
t+1−tw
)
(1− δw)−tw(1− δs)tw−1
+min

 (t+ 1)(1− δz)K ,
(
K−1
t
)
(1 − δw)
−tw (1− δs)
tw+1∑min{t+1,Kw}
tw=max{0,t+1−Ks}
(
Kw
tw
)(
Ks
t+1−tw
)
(1− δw)−tw (1− δs)tw

 . (84l)
Theorem 3 (Lower bound on Cs(Mw,Ms)).
Csec (Mw,Ms) ≥ upper hull
{(
R˜(ℓ), M˜(ℓ)w , M˜
(ℓ)
s
)
: ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K+ Kw + KwKs − 1}
}
. (85)
Proof. By time/memory-sharing arguments, it suffices to prove the achievability of the rate-memory triples
{
(R˜(ℓ), M˜
(ℓ)
w , M˜
(ℓ)
s ) :
ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K + Kw + KwKs − 1}
}
. The triple {(R˜(1), M˜
(1)
w , M˜
(1)
s ) is achieved by the “cached keys” scheme, see
Subsections V-A1 and VIII-A. The triples (R˜(ℓ), M˜
(ℓ)
w , M˜
(ℓ)
s ), for ℓ ∈ {2, . . . ,Kw}
}
, are achieved by the “secure pig-
gyback coding scheme with keys at all receivers”, see Subsections V-A2 and VIII-B. The triples (R˜(ℓ), M˜
(ℓ)
w , M˜
(ℓ)
s ), for
ℓ ∈ {Kw + 1, . . . ,Kw + KwKs}
}
, are achieved by the “symmetric secure piggyback coding” scheme, see Subsections V-A3
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and VIII-C. Finally, the triples (R˜(ℓ), M˜
(ℓ)
w , M˜
(ℓ)
s ), for ℓ ∈ {Kw + KwKs + 1, . . . ,K + Kw + KwKs − 1}, are achieved by the
“secure generalized coded caching” scheme sketched in Section V-A4.
Corollary 4. The rate-memory tradeoff
(
R˜(1), M˜
(1)
w , M˜
(1)
s
)
is optimal, i.e.,
Csec
(
Mw = M˜
(1)
w ,Ms = M˜
(1)
s
)
= R˜(1). (86)
Proof: Achievability follows from the two achievable rate-memory triples (R˜(0), M˜
(0)
w = 0, M˜
(0)
s = 0) and
(R˜(1), M˜
(1)
w , M˜
(1)
s ) in (84a)–(84c) and by time/memory-sharing arguments. The converse follows by specializing upper bound
(42a) in Theorem 1 to kw = Kw and ks = Ks. In fact, for kw = Kw, ks = Ks, and cache sizes Mw = M˜
(1)
w and Ms = M˜
(1)
s ,
the maximizing β equals
β =
Kw(1− δs)
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1− δw)
(87)
when δz < δw, and it equals β = 0 when δz ≥ δw.
Notice that when δz ≤ δs, then
R˜(1) = M˜(1)w = M˜
(1)
s . (88)
This rate is achieved by XORing the messages with secret keys stored in the cache memories, and by sending the resulting
bits using a traditional non-secure code for the erasure BC.
VI. GLOBAL SECRECY CAPACITY-MEMORY TRADEOFF
In the preceding sections, we considered scenarios with unequal cache sizes at the receivers and showed that in these
scenarios joint cache-channel coding schemes can significantly improve over the traditional separation-based schemes with
their typical uniform cache assignment. In this section, we emphasize the importance of unequal cache sizes that depend on
the receivers’ channel conditions by focusing on the global secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff Csec,glob, which is the largest
secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff that is possible given a total cache budget
KwMw + KsMs ≤ Mtot. (89)
We assign the same cache memory size Mw to all weak receivers and the same cache memory size Ms to all strong receivers.
Using simple time/memory-sharing arguments, it can be shown that this assumption is without loss in optimality.
So, the main quantity of interest in this section is
Csec,glob(Mtot) := max
Mw,Ms≥0 :
KwMw+KsMs≤Mtot
Csec(Mw,Ms) (90)
A. Results
Using the achievability results in Theorems 2 and 3 combined with an appropriate cache assignment and time/memory-sharing
arguments, yields the following lower bound on Csec,glob(Mtot).
Corollary 5. (Lower bound on Csec,glob(Mtot)) The global secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff Csec,glob is lower bounded as
Csec,glob(Mtot) ≥ upper hull
{(
R(ℓ),Mtot = KwM
(ℓ)
)
,
(
R˜(ℓ
′),Mtot = KwM˜
(ℓ′)
w + KsM˜
(ℓ′)
s
)
:
ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,Kw + 3} and ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,K+ Kw + KwKs − 1}
}
. (91)
Proposition 2. If the eavesdropper is weaker than the strong receivers, i.e.,
δz > δs, (92)
then for small cache sizes:
Csec,glob(Mtot) = R
(0) +
(δz − δs)
+
Kw(δz − δs)+ + Ks(δz − δw)+
Mtot, 0 ≤ Mtot ≤ KwM
(1). (93)
If the eavesdropper is at least as strong as the strong receivers, i.e.,
δz ≤ δs, (94)
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Fig. 7. Cache content at weak and strong receivers in order of increasing total cache budget.
then for small cache sizes:
Csec,glob(Mtot) =
Mtot
K
, 0 ≤ Mtot ≤ K ·
(1− δw)(1 − δs)
Kw(1 − δs) + Ks(1− δw)
. (95)
Proof: Achievability of (93) follows from Corollary 2 and by assigning all available cache memory uniformly across weak
receivers, so Mw =
Mtot
Kw
and Ms = 0. The converse to (93) can be proved by specializing Lemma 2 to the set of all users
S = K. For a given choice of the cache assignment Mw,Ms ≥ 0, Lemma 2 yields (amongst others) that for some β ∈ [0, 1],
the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff is upper bounded as
Kw · Csec,glob(Mtot) ≤ β(δz − δw)
+ + KwMw (96)
and
K · Csec,glob(Mtot) ≤ β(δz − δw)
+ + (1 − β)(δz − δs)
+ +Mtot. (97)
Upper bounding now KwMw by Mtot and combining (96) and (97) into a single bound yields:
Csec,glob(Mtot) ≤ max
β∈[0,1]
min
{
β(δz − δw)
+ +Mtot
Kw
,
β(δz − δw)
+ + (1− β)(δz − δs)
+
K
+
Mtot
K
}
. (98)
If δz > δw, then the maximizing β in the above upper bound is as in (65) when Mw is replaced by Mtot; otherwise the
maximizing β equals 0. Plugging these values into (98) establishes the desired upper bound.
Achievability of (95) follows from time/memory-sharing arguments and from the achievability of the rate-memory triple
(R˜(1), M˜
(1)
w , M˜
(1)
s ) in (84a)–(84c), which under (94) specializes to the rate-memory triple:
R˜(1) = M˜(1)w = M˜
(1)
s =
(1− δw)(1− δs)
Kw(1 − δs) + Ks(1− δw)
. (99)
In fact, the rate-memory triples under consideration are achieved by storing an independent secret key at each receiver and
securing the messages with these keys by means of one-time pads. This requires a uniform cache assignment across all
receivers, i.e., Mw = Ms =
Mtot
K
. The converse to (95) follows from upper bound (97), which under (94) specializes to
Csec,glob(Mtot) ≤ Mtot/K.
Figure 7 illustrates our choices of the cache contents when δz > δs in the order of increasing total cache memory Mtot.
When the total cache budget Mtot is small, all of it is assigned to the weak receivers and it is solely used to store secret keys.
For a slightly larger cache budget Mtot, it is assigned to all receivers and secret keys are stored in the cache memories. When
the total cache budget Mtot exceeds the size required to store the keys for securing the entire communication, the additional
space is used to store data at weak receivers. Once the cached data renders the weak receivers equally powerful (in terms of
their decoding performance) as the strong receivers, data is also stored in strong receivers’ cache memories. When δz ≤ δs,
then our choice is similar, but we start with placing secret keys directly at all the receivers.
B. Results under Uniform Cache Assignment
For comparison, we also propose a lower bound on Csec,glob(Mtot) when the cache memory is uniformly assigned over all
receivers, i.e.
Mw = Ms =
Mtot
K
. (100)
Consider the following K+ 2 rate-memory pairs:
• R(0)sym :=
(δz − δs)
+ · (δz − δw)
+
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(δz − δw)
, (101a)
M
(0)
sym := 0; (101b)
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• R(1)sym :=
(1− δw)(1− δs)
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1− δw)
, (101c)
M
(1)
sym :=
(1− δs)min {1− δz, 1− δw}
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1 − δw)
; (101d)
• For t ∈ {1, . . . ,Ks − 1}
R(t+1)sym :=
(
K
t
)
(1− δw)(1− δs)(
K
t+1
)
(1− δs)−
(
Ks
t+1
)
(δw − δs)
, (101e)
M
(t+1)
sym :=
D · t
(
K
t
)
(1− δw)(1 − δs)
K
[(
K
t+1
)
(1 − δs)−
(
Ks
t+1
)
(δw − δs)
] + (K− t)
(
K
t
)
(1− δs)min {1− δz, 1− δw}
K
[(
K
t+1
)
(1− δs)−
(
Ks
t+1
)
(δw − δs)
] ; (101f)
• For t ∈ {Ks, . . . ,K}
R(t+1)sym :=
(t+ 1)(1− δw)
(K− t)
, (101g)
M
(t+1)
sym :=
D · t(t+ 1)(1− δw)
K(K− t)
+
(t+ 1)
K
min {1− δz, 1− δw} . (101h)
Proposition 3 (Lower Bound on Csec(Mw = Msym,Ms = Msym)).
Csec (Mw = Msym,Ms = Msym) ≥ upper hull
{(
R(ℓ)sym,M
(ℓ)
sym
)
: ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,K+ 1}
}
. (102)
Proof. It suffices to prove the achievability of the K+2 rate-memory pairs {(R
(ℓ)
sym,M
(ℓ)
sym) : ℓ = 0, . . . ,K+1}. The rate-memory
pair (R
(0)
sym,M
(0)
sym) is achievable by Remark 1. The rate-memory pair (R
(1)
sym,M
(1)
sym) is achievable because, by Theorem 3, rate
R˜(1) = R
(1)
sym is achievable with cache size M˜
(1)
w at weak receivers and cache size M˜
(1)
s at strong receivers, and because
M
(1)
sym = max
{
M˜
(1)
w , M˜
(1)
s
}
. For each t ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the rate-memory pair (R
(t+1)
sym ,M
(t+1)
sym ) is achieved by a scheme that
combines the Sengupta et al. secure coded caching scheme [6] with a standard BC code. Notice that when t ≥ Ks, then each
of the secured XORs produced by the Sengupta et al. scheme is intended for at least one weak receiver, and communication
is limited by this weak receiver. Each secured XOR, which is of rate
(
K
t
)−1
Rsym, thus requires slightly more than
(
K
t
)−1 nRsym
1−δw
channel uses to be transmitted reliably. When t < Ks, then
(
Ks
t+1
)
of the secured XOR are only sent to strong receivers and
can thus be sent reliably by using slightly more than
(
K
t
)−1 nRsym
1−δs
channel uses. The remaining
(
K
t+1
)
−
(
Ks
t+1
)
secured XORs
are sent to at least one weak receiver, and can thus be sent reliably by using slightly more than
(
K
t
)−1 nRsym
1−δw
channel uses.
C. Numerical Comparison
Figure 8 plots the lower bound on Csec,glob(Mtot) in Corollary 5 (black line) for an example with Kw = 20 weak receivers
an Ks = 10 strong receivers. The eavesdropper is degraded with respect to all legitimate receivers. For comparison, the figure
also shows our lower bound on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff for the scenarios where the available cache memory is
uniformly assigned over all weak receivers , i.e., Mw = Mtot/Kw and Ms = 0, and where it is uniformly assigned over all
receivers (blue line), i.e., Mw = Ms = Mtot/K. Finally, the red line depicts the lower bound on the standard (non-secure)
global capacity-memory tradeoff obtained from [20] and [5]. One observes that our lower bound on the global secrecy capacity-
memory tradeoff is close to the currently best known lower bound on the non-secure capacity-memory tradeoff. Moreover,
similarly to [20], for the global secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff it is suboptimal to assign the cache memories uniformly
across users (unless the eavesdropper is stronger than all other receivers). In particular, as Proposition 3 shows, for small cache
memories all of it should be assigned uniformly over the weak receivers only.
VII. CODING SCHEMES WHEN ONLY WEAK RECEIVERS HAVE CACHE MEMORIES
A. Wiretap and Cached Keys
Let Subphase 1 comprise the first βn channel uses and Subphase 2 the last (1 − β)n channel uses, with β chosen as
β =
Kw(δz − δs)
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(1 − δw)
. (103)
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Fig. 8. Lower bounds on Csec,glob(Mtot) for δw = 0.7, δs = 0.2, δz = 0.8, D = 50, Kw = 20, and Ks = 10.
Fix a small ǫ > 0. Let the secret keys K1, . . . ,KKw be independent of each other and of rate
RKey = min
{
β(1− δz)
Kw
, R
}
, (104)
where the message rate R is chosen as
R =
(δz − δs)(1− δw)
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(1− δw)
− ǫ. (105)
The scheme requires a cache size at weak receivers equal to
Mw = RKey = min
{
(δz − δs)(1 − δz)
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(1− δw)
,
(δz − δs)(1 − δw)
Kw(δz − δs) + Ks(1− δw)
− ǫ
}
. (106)
We analyze the scheme when averaged over the choice of the random code construction C. By the joint typicality lemma,
the average probability of a decoding error at the weak receivers tends to 0 as n→∞, because
R <
β(1 − δw)
Kw
. (107)
The probability of error of the wiretap decoding at the strong receivers tends to 0 as n→∞, because
R <
(1− β)(δz − δs)
Ks
. (108)
Notice that by the choice of β in (103), the two constraints (107) and (108) coincide.
We conclude this analysis by verifying the secrecy constraint averaged over the choice of the codebooks C. For fixed
blocklength n:
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C) =
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
βn
1 |C) +
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n
βn+1|C)
=
1
n
I(Wd1 , . . . ,WdKw ;Z
βn
1 |C) +
1
n
I(WdKw+1 , . . . ,WdK ;Z
n
βn+1|C) (109)
The first term in (109) tends to 0 as n → ∞ by (104) and by Lemma 1. The second term tends to 0 as n → ∞ because of
the properties of a wiretap code.
From the analysis we conclude that the average over all choices of the codebooks satisfies the desired properties. There must
thus exist at least one good codebook. Letting ǫ→ 0 concludes the achievability proof of the rate-memory pair R = R(1) and
Mw = M
(1) in (62c) and (62d).
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B. Cached-Aided Superposition-Jamming
Let
γ :=
{
Kw(δz − δs)
Ks(1− δw) + Kw(δw − δs)
,
Kw(1 − δs)
Ks(1− δw) + Kw(1− δs)
}
, (110)
and set the rate
R =
γ(1− δw)
Kw
− ǫ. (111)
Let further p ∈ [0, 1/2] be so that its binary entropy-function hb(p) = 1− γ.
Placement phase: Generate independent random keys K1, . . . ,Kw of rate
RKey = min
{
1− δz
Kw
, R
}
(112)
Store each key Ki in the cache memory of Receiver i, for i ∈ Kw.
Delivery phase: Fix a small ǫ > 0, and generate a cloud center codebook
Ccenter =
{
un(1), . . . , un(⌊2nR⌋)
}
(113)
by picking all entries of all codewords i.i.d. according to a Bernoulli-1/2 distribution. Choose a wiretap binning rate of
Rbin = {(1− δz)− γ(1− δw)}
+. (114)
Then, superposition on each codeword un(w), for w ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋}, a satellite codebook
Csat(w) =
{
xn(v, b|w) : v ∈
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nR⌋
}
, b ∈
{
1, . . . ⌊2nRbin⌋
}}
(115)
by drawing all entries of all codewords i.i.d. according to a Bernoulli-p distribution.
The transmitter generates the tuples
Wsec :=
(
sec
(
Wd1 ,K1
)
, sec
(
Wd2 ,K2
)
, sec
(
Wd3 ,K3
)
, . . . , sec
(
WdKw ,KKw
))
, (116)
and
Wsat :=
(
WdKw+1 , . . . ,WdK
)
, (117)
and draws B uniformly at random over {1, . . . , ⌊2nRbin⌋}. It then sends the codeword
xn
(
Wsat, B
∣∣Wsec) (118)
over the channel. Each weak receiver i ∈ Kw decodes the message Wsec in the cloud center, and with the key Ki retrieved
from its cache memory, it produces a guess of its desired message Wdi . Each strong receiver j ∈ Ks decodes both messages
Wsec,Wsat as well as the random binning index B and extracts the guess of its desired message Wdj .
Analysis: The scheme requires cache memories at the weak receivers of size
Mw = RKey = min
{
1− δz
Kw
,
(δz − δs)(1 − δw)
Ks(1− δw) + Kw(δw − δs)
− ǫ
}
. (119)
We analyze the scheme on average over the random choice of the codebook C. The average probability of decoding error at
a weak receiver tends to 0 as n→∞, because
KwR < γ(1− δw). (120a)
Similarly, the average probability of decoding error at a strong receiver tends to 0 as n→∞, because
Rbin + KsR < (1 − γ)(1− δs). (120b)
We turn to the secrecy analysis of the scheme. We have:
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C) =
1
n
I(Wd1 , . . . ,WdKw ;Z
n|C) +
1
n
I(WdKw+1 , . . . ,WdK ;Z
n|Wd1 , . . . ,WdKw , C). (121)
The first term on the right-hand side of (121) tends to 0 as n → ∞ because of Lemma 1, the key-rate (112), and because
when averaged over codebooks, the satellite codebooks can simply be considered as additional noise. That the second term in
(121) tends to 0 as n → ∞, can be shown following the steps in [19] or by adapting the steps in [17, Chapter 22]. Putting
these observations together proves that 1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C)→ 0 as n→∞.
By standard arguments, one can then conclude that there must exist at least one deterministic codebook such that the
probability of decoding error vanishes for n→∞ and the secrecy constraint (24) constraint holds.
Since R→ R(2) and Mw → M
(2) as ǫ→ 0, this establishes achievability of the rate-memory pair (R(2),M
(2)
w ) in (62e) and
(62f).
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C. Secure Cache-Aided Piggyback Coding I
Delivery transmission will be partitioned into three subphases, whose lengths are determined by the parameters:
β1 =
(Kw − t)(Kw − t+ 1)(δz − δs)min{δw − δs, δz − δs}
(Kw− t+ 1)(δz − δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)+(Kw− t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
, (122a)
β2 =
Ks(Kw − t+ 1)(t+ 1)(1− δw)(δz − δs)
(Kw− t+ 1)(δz − δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)+(Kw− t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
, (122b)
β3 =
K
2
st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
(Kw − t)(δw − δs) + Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1 − δw)
2
. (122c)
Notice that β1 + β2 + β3 = 1.
Message splitting: Fix a small ǫ > 0. Divide each message into two independent submessages
Wd =
[
W
(A)
d ,W
(B)
d
]
, d ∈ D, (123)
that are of rates
R(A) =
Kst(t+ 1)(1 − δw)
2(δz − δs)
(Kw− t+ 1)(δz − δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)+(Kw− t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
− ǫ/2 (124)
and
R(B) =
(Kw − t+ 1)(t+ 1)(1− δw)(δz − δs)min{δw − δs, δz − δs}
(Kw− t+ 1)(δz − δs)
[
Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)+(Kw− t)min {δw − δs, δz − δs}
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
− ǫ/2. (125)
Denote the
(
Kw
t−1
)
subsets of {1, . . . ,Kw} of size t− 1 by G
(t−1)
1 , . . . , G
(t−1)
( Kwt−1)
; the
(
Kw
t
)
subsets of {1, . . . ,Kw} of size t by
G
(t)
1 , . . . , G
(t)
(Kwt )
; and the
(
Kw
t+1
)
subsets of {1, . . . ,Kw} of size t+ 1 by G
(t+1)
1 , . . . , G
(t+1)
(Kwt+1)
.
Divide each message W
(A)
d into
(
Kw
t−1
)
submessages
W
(A)
d =
{
W
(A)
d,G
(t−1)
ℓ
: ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t− 1
)}}
, (126)
of rate
r(A) = R(A)
(
Kw
t− 1
)−1
, (127)
and divide each message W
(B)
d into
(
Kw
t
)
submessages
W
(B)
d =
{
W
(B)
d,G
(t)
ℓ
: ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t
)}}
, (128)
of rate
r(B) = R(B)
(
Kw
t
)−1
. (129)
Key generation:
• For each ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t+1
)}
, generate an independent random key K
G
(t+1)
ℓ
of rate
RKey,1 =
(
Kw
t+ 1
)−1
· β1 ·min {1− δz , 1− δw} . (130)
• For each ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t
)}
, generate an independent random key K
G
(t)
ℓ
of rate
RKey,2 =
(
Kw
t
)−1
· β2 ·min {1− δz, 1− δw} . (131)
Define the binning rate
Rbin =
(
Kw
t
)−1
· β2 ·min {max {0, δw − δz} , δw − δs} . (132)
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Placement phase: Placement is as indicated in the following table.
Cache at weak receiver i{{
W
(A)
d,G
(t−1)
ℓ
}
ℓ : i∈G
(t−1)
ℓ
,
{
W
(B)
d,G
(t)
ℓ
}
ℓ : i∈G
(t)
ℓ
}D
d=1{
K
G
(t+1)
ℓ
}
ℓ : i∈G
(t+1)
ℓ
,
{
K
G
(t)
ℓ
}
ℓ : i∈G
(t)
ℓ
Delivery phase: Is divided into three subphases of lengths β1n, β2n, and β3n.
Subphase 1: This subphase is dedicated to the transmission of the parts of W
(B)
d1
, . . . ,W
(B)
dKw
that are not stored in the cache
memories of the respective weak receivers. For each ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t+1
)
}, the transmitter first calculates the XOR-message
W
(B)
XOR,G
(t+1)
ℓ
:=
⊕
i∈G
(t+1)
ℓ
W
(B)
di,G
(t+1)
ℓ
\{i}
, (133)
and its secured version
W
(B)
sec,G
(t+1)
ℓ
= sec
(
W
(B)
XOR,G
(t+1)
ℓ
, K
G
(t+1)
ℓ
)
. (134)
It then sends the secured message tuple
W
(B)
sec,w := (W
(B)
sec,G
(t+1)
1
, . . . ,W
(B)
sec,G
(t+1)
(Kwt+1)
) (135)
using a capacity achieving point-to-point code to all weak receivers. After decoding the message tuple (135), each weak
receiver i retrieves the secret key K
G
(t+1)
ℓ
from its cache memory, for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t+1
)
} so that i ∈ G
(t+1)
ℓ , and produces
Wˆ
(B)
XOR,G
(t+1)
ℓ
. Then, it also retrieves the submessages
{
W
(B)
dk,G
(t+1)
ℓ
\{k}
}
k∈G
(t+1)
ℓ
\{i}
(136)
from its cache memory, and guesses the desired submessage as:
Wˆ
(B)
dk,G
(t+1)
ℓ
\{i}
= Wˆ
(B)
XOR,G
(t+1)
ℓ
⊕
k∈G
(t+1)
ℓ
\{i}
W
(B)
dk,G
(t+1)
ℓ
\{k}
. (137)
At the end of Subphase 1, each weak receiver i ∈ Kw assembles the guesses produced in (137) with the parts of W
(B)
di
it has
stored in its cache memory to form a guess Wˆ
(B)
di
.
Subphase 2: This subphase is dedicated to the transmission of the parts of W
(A)
di
that are not stored in weak receiver i’s
cache memory, for i ∈ Kw, and messages W
(B)
dj
, for j ∈ Ks. Time-sharing is applied over
(
Kw
t
)
periods, each of length
n2 =
(
Kw
t
)−1
· β2n.
The periods are labeled G
(t)
1 , . . . , G
(t)
(Kwt )
. For Period G
(t)
ℓ , ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t
)}
, the transmitter calculates the XOR-message
W
(A)
XOR,G
(t)
ℓ
:=
⊕
i∈G
(t)
ℓ
W
(A)
di,G
(t)
ℓ
\{i}
(138a)
and its secured version
W
(A)
sec,G
(t)
ℓ
:= sec
(
W
(A)
XOR,G
(t)
ℓ
,K
G
(t)
ℓ
)
(138b)
It also forms the tuple of non-secured messages
W
(B)
s,G
(t)
ℓ
:=
(
W
(B)
dKw+1,G
(t)
ℓ
, . . . ,W
(B)
dK,G
(t)
ℓ
)
(138c)
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which it sends to the strong receivers. To this end, generate for each period G
(t)
ℓ a secure piggyback codebook [22], see
Figure 3,
C
spg,G
(t)
ℓ
=
{
xn2
G
(t)
ℓ
(
ℓrow; ℓcol; b
)
: ℓrow ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌊
2nr
(A)⌋}
, ℓcol ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌊
2nr
(B)⌋}
, b ∈
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nRbin⌋
}}
, (139)
by drawing each entry of each codeword i.i.d. according to a Bernoulli-1/2 distribution. The rates r(A), r(B), and Rbin are
defined in (127), (129), and (132).
The transmitter draws an index B uniformly at random over {1, . . . , ⌊2nRbin⌋}, and sends the codeword
xn2
G
(t)
ℓ
(
W
(A)
sec,G
(t)
ℓ
; W
(B)
s,G
(t)
ℓ
; B
)
(140)
over the channel.
We now describe the decoding, starting with the decoding at the weak receivers. For each i ∈ Kw and each ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t
)}
so that i ∈ G
(t)
ℓ , Receiver i decodes message W
(A)
di,G
(t)
ℓ
\{i}
sent in Period G
(t)
ℓ by performing the following steps:
1) It retrieves the secret key K
G
(t)
ℓ
and the messages W
(B)
dKw+1,G
(t)
ℓ
, . . . ,W
(B)
dK,G
(t)
ℓ
from its cache memory.
2) It extracts the subcodebook
C˜
spg,G
(t)
ℓ
(
W
(B)
s,G
(t)
ℓ
)
:=
{
xn2
G
(t)
ℓ
(
ℓrow; W
(B)
s,G
(t)
ℓ
; b
)
: ℓrow ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌊
2n2r
(A)⌋}
, b ∈
{
1, . . . , ⌊2nRbin⌋
}}
. (141)
3) Based on the reduced codebook C˜
spg,G
(t)
ℓ
(
W
(B)
s,G
(t)
ℓ
)
, it decodes the secured message W
(A)
sec,G
(t)
ℓ
from its channel outputs
in this period G
(t)
ℓ .
4) It applies the inverse mapping sec−1K
G
(t)
ℓ
to the message decoded in step 3) to obtain the guess Wˆ
(A)
XOR,G
(t)
ℓ
.
5) Finally, it produces the guess
Wˆ
(A)
di,G
(t)
ℓ
\{i}
= Wˆ
(A)
XOR,G
(t)
ℓ
⊕
k∈G
(t)
ℓ
\{i}
W
(A)
dk,G
(t)
ℓ
\{k}
. (142)
Strong receivers treat the secure piggyback codebook as a simple wiretap codebook and decode all transmitted messages as
well as the bin indices.
At the end of Subphase 2, each weak receiver i ∈ Kw assembles the parts of submessage W
(A)
di
that it decoded or that are
stored in its cache memory to form the guess Wˆ
(A)
di
. Similarly, each strong receiver j ∈ Ks assembles the decoded parts of
W
(B)
dj
to form the guess Wˆ
(B)
dj
.
Subphase 3: A wiretap code is used to send the message tuple
W
(A)
dKw+1
, . . . ,W
(A)
dK
(143)
to all the strong receivers Kw + 1, . . . ,K.
After the last subphase, each Receiver k ∈ K assembles its guesses produced for the two submessages W
(A)
dk
and W
(B)
dk
to
the final guess Wˆk.
Analysis: Analysis is performed averaged over the random choice of the codebooks. We first verify that in each of the three
subphases the probability of decoding error tends to 0 as n → ∞. Only weak receivers decode during the first subphase.
Probability of decoding error vanishes asymptotically as n→∞, because(
Kw
t+1
)(
Kw
t
)−1
R(B)
(1− δw)
=
Kw−t
t+1 R
(B)
(1− δw)
< β1. (144)
Only strong receivers decode during the third subphase. Probability of decoding error in Subphase 3 vanishes asymptotically,
because
KsR
(A)
(δz − δs)
< β3. (145)
Probability of decoding error at the weak receivers in Subphase 2 vanishes asymptotically, because
Kw−t+1
t
R(A)
(1− δw)
< β2. (146)
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Probability of decoding error at the strong receivers in Subphase 2 vanishes asymptotically, because
Kw−t+1
t
R(A) + KsR
(B) +
(
Kw
t
)
Rbin
(1 − δs)
< β2. (147)
Whenever the decodings in all subphases are successful, all receivers correctly guess their desired messages. Since the decoding
error for each subphase vanishes asymptotically, we conclude that also the average overall probability of error vanishes.
We verify the secrecy constraint averaged over the choice of the code construction. For fixed blocklength n:
1
n
I (W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C) =
1
n
I
(
W
(B)
d1
, . . . ,W
(B)
dKw
;Zβ1n1
∣∣C)+ 1
n
I
(
W
(A)
d1
, . . . ,W
(A)
dKw
,W
(B)
dKw+1
, . . . ,W
(B)
dK
;Z
(β1+β2)n
β1n+1
∣∣C)
+
1
n
I
(
W
(A)
dKw+1
, . . . ,W
(A)
dK
;Zn(β1+β2)n+1
∣∣C), (148)
because of the independence of the communications in the three subphases. By Lemma 1, all of the three summands can be
bounded by ǫ/3 for sufficiently large n. This holds in particular for the second summand because from the eavesdropper’s
point of view, the structure of the piggyback codebook is meaningless and for each message tuple
(
W
(A)
sec,G
(t)
ℓ
; W
(B)
s,G
(t)
ℓ
)
, the
codeword to transmit is chosen uniformly at random (depending on B and K
G
(t)
ℓ
) over a set of 2n2rs i.i.d. random codewords
where rs = RKey,2 +Rbin = min{1− δz, 1− δs}.
Since averaged over the random codebooks, the probability of decoding error and the average mutual information
1
n
I (W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C) both vanish as n → ∞, there must exist at least one choice of the codebooks so that for this
choice PWorste and
1
n
I (W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n) both vanish asymptotically.
Notice that for each t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}, the rate of communication satisfies
R = R(A) +R(B) = R(t+2) − ǫ, (149)
and weak receivers require a cache memory of
Mw = D
(t− 1)
Kw
R(A) + D
t
Kw
R(B) +
(
Kw − 1
t
)
RKey,1 +
(
Kw − 1
t− 1
)
RKey,2 = M
(t+2) − D ·
t− 1/2
Kw
ǫ. (150)
Letting ǫ→ 0 thus concludes the achievability proof of rate-memory pairs (R(t+2),M
(t+2)
w ), for t = 1, . . . ,Kw− 1, as defined
in (62g)–(62h).
D. Secure Cache-Aided Piggyback Coding II
Let
β =
Kw(δz − δs)
Ksmin{1− δz , 1− δw}+ Kw(δz − δs)
(151)
Subphase 1 is of length βn and Subphase 2 of length (1 − β)n.
Submessages {W
(A)
d } are of rate
R(A) =
(δz − δs)min{1− δz , 1− δw}
Ksmin{1− δz, 1− δw}+ Kw(δz − δs)
− ǫ/2, (152)
and submessages {W
(B)
d } are of rate
R(B) =
Kw(δz − δs)
2
Ks[Ksmin{1− δz, 1− δw}+ Kw(δz − δs)]
− ǫ/2. (153)
The key rate is chosen as
RKey = R
(A). (154)
We analyze the scheme averaged over the random choice of the codebooks C. Probability of decoding error at the weak
receivers in Subphase 1 vanishes asymptotically as n→∞, because
KwR
(A)
(1− δw)
< β. (155)
Probability of decoding error at the strong receivers in Subphase 1 vanishes asymptotically, because
KwR
(A) + KsR
(B)
(1− δs)
< β. (156)
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Probability of decoding error in Subphase 2 vanishes asymptotically, because
KsR
(A)
(δz − δs)
< (1 − β). (157)
As a consequence, also the overall probability of error (averaged over the random choice of the codebooks C) vanishes as
n → ∞. Following a similar secrecy analysis as in the previous Subsection VII-C, it can be shown that also the averaged
mutual information 1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C) vanishes as n→∞. This implies that there must exist at least one choice of the
codebooks so that for this choice PWorste → 0 and
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n)→ 0 as n→∞.
Notice now that
R = R(A) +R(B) =
δz − δs
Ks
− ǫ. (158)
Moreover, the required cache size at each weak receiver is
Mw = DR
(B) +RKey = M
(Kw+2)
w − Dǫ/2. (159)
Taking ǫ→ 0, this concludes the proof of achievability of the rate-memory pair R(Kw+2),M
(Kw+2)
w in (62i) and (62j).
VIII. CODING SCHEMES WHEN ALL RECEIVERS HAVE CACHE MEMORIES
A. Cached Keys
Fix a small ǫ > 0 and let
β =
Kw(1− δs)
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1− δw)
, (160)
and the message rate be
R =
β(1− δw)
Kw
− ǫ. (161)
Notice that by the choice of the parameter β, also
R =
(1− β)(1 − δs)
Ks
− ǫ. (162)
Choose key rates
RKey,w =
β
Kw
·min
{
1− δz, 1− δw
}
, (163)
RKey,s =
1− β
Ks
·min
{
1− δz, 1− δs
}
, (164)
and let secret keys K1, . . . ,KKw be of rate RKey,w and secret keys KKw+1, . . . ,KK be of rate RKey,s.
The cache requirement at weak receivers is
Mw = RKey,w =
(1− δs)
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1− δw)
min
{
1− δz , 1− δw
}
(165)
and the cache requirement at strong receivers is
Ms = RKey,s =
(1− δw)
Kw(1− δs) + Ks(1− δw)
min
{
1− δz, 1− δs
}
(166)
Analysis of the probability of error and of the secrecy constraint (24) are standard and omitted. Letting ǫ → 0 proves
achievability of the rate-memory par (R˜(1), M˜
(1)
w , M˜
(1)
s ).
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B. Secure Cache-Aided Piggyback Coding with Keys at All Receivers
The scheme follows closely the secure cache-aided piggyback coding I in Subsection VII-C, but for a different choice of
rates and time-sharings and with additional secret keys for Subphases 2 and 3 which render wiretap binning useless.
The time-sharing parameters used here are :
β1 =
(Kw − t+ 1)(Kw − t)(1 − δs)(δw − δs)
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
(Kw − t)(δw − δs) + Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
. (167a)
β2 =
Ks(Kw − t+ 1)(t+ 1)(1− δw)(1− δs)
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
(Kw − t)(δw − δs) + Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
(167b)
β3 =
K
2
st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
(Kw − t)(δw − δs) + Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
. (167c)
and the rates are
R(A) =
Kst(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2(1 − δs)
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
(Kw − t)(δw − δs) + Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
− ǫ/2 (168)
and
R(B) =
(Kw − t+ 1)(t+ 1)(1− δw)(1− δs)(δw − δs)
(Kw − t+ 1)(1− δs)
[
(Kw − t)(δw − δs) + Ks(t+ 1)(1− δw)
]
+ K2st(t+ 1)(1− δw)
2
− ǫ/2. (169)
The following keys are generated:
• For each ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t+1
)}
, generate an independent secret key K
G
(t+1)
ℓ
of rate
RKey,1 =
(
Kw
t+ 1
)−1
· β1 ·min {1− δz , 1− δw} . (170)
• For each ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t
)}
, generate an independent secret key K
G
(t)
ℓ
of rate
RKey,2 =
(
Kw
t
)−1
· β2 ·min {1− δz, 1− δw} (171)
and Ks independent secret keys K
Kw+1,G
(t)
ℓ
, . . . ,K
K,G
(t)
ℓ
of rate
RKey,3 =
(
Kw
t
)−1
·
β2
Ks
·min {max {0, δw − δz} , δw − δs} . (172)
• For j ∈ Ks, generate an independent secret key Kj of rate
RKey,4 =
β3
Ks
·min {1− δz, 1− δs} . (173)
Placement phase: For each weak receiver i ∈ Kw, cache
Vi =
{
W
(A)
d,G
(t−1)
ℓ
: d ∈ D and i ∈ G
(t−1)
ℓ
} ⋃ {
W
(B)
d,G
(t)
ℓ
: d ∈ D and i ∈ G
(t)
ℓ
} ⋃ {
K
G
(t+1)
ℓ
: i ∈ G
(t+1)
ℓ
}
⋃ {
K
G
(t)
ℓ
: i ∈ G
(t)
ℓ
} ⋃ {
K
j,G
(t)
ℓ
: i ∈ G
(t)
ℓ and j ∈ Ks
}
. (174)
For each strong receiver j ∈ Ks, cache
Vj = Kj
⋃ {
K
j,G
(t)
ℓ
: ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t
)}}
. (175)
Delivery phase: Is divided into three subphases of lengths n1 = β1n, n2 = β2n, and n3 = β3n, where β1, β2, and β3 are
defined in (167).
Subphase 1: Is as described in Subsection VII-C.
Subphase 2: Similar to Subsection VII-C, but with extra keys. As in Subsection VII-C, this subphase is split into
(
Kw
t
)
equally-long periods that we label by all t-user subsets of Kw i.e., by G
(t)
1 , . . . , G
(t)
(Kwt )
. For the transmission in Period G
(t)
ℓ ,
for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,
(
Kw
t
)
}, a standard piggyback codebook
C
pg,G
(t)
ℓ
=
{
xn2
G
(t)
ℓ
(
ℓrow; ℓcol
)
: ℓrow ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌊
2nr
(A)⌋}
, ℓcol ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌊
2nr
(B)⌋}}
, (176)
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is generated by drawing all entries i.i.d. Bernoulli-1/2. The codebooks are revealed to the transmitter and all receivers, and
the rates r(A) and r(B) are chosen as
r(A) = R(A)
(
Kw
t− 1
)−1
(177)
r(B) = R(B)
(
Kw
t
)−1
. (178)
At the beginning of Period G
(t)
ℓ , the transmitter computes
W
(A)
sec,w,G
(t)
ℓ
= sec
( ⊕
i∈G
(t)
ℓ
W
(A)
di,G
(t)
ℓ
\{i}
, K
G
(t)
ℓ
)
. (179)
and
W
(B)
sec,s,G
(t)
ℓ
:=
(
sec
(
W
(B)
dKw+1,G
(t)
ℓ
, K
Kw+1,G
(t)
ℓ
)
, . . . , sec
(
W
(B)
dK,G
(t)
ℓ
, K
K,G
(t)
ℓ
))
, (180)
and sends the codeword
xn2
G
(t)
ℓ
(
W
(A)
sec,w,G
(t)
ℓ
; W
(B)
sec,s,G
(t)
ℓ
)
(181)
over the channel. Decoding of Period G
(t)
ℓ is performed as follows. All weak receivers i ∈ G
(t)
ℓ compute the message tuple to
the strong receivers W
(B)
sec,s,G
(t)
ℓ
and perform their decoding steps as described in Subsection VII-C. Strong receivers decode
both secured message tuples transmitted in this period. Any given strong receiver j ∈ Ks can then recover its desired message
W
(B)
dj ,G
(t)
ℓ
(182)
using the secret key K
j,G
(t)
ℓ
stored in its cache memory.
At the end of the subphase, each weak receiver i ∈ Kw assembles the parts of submessage W
(A)
di
that it decoded or it has
stored in its cache memory, and forms the guess Wˆ
(A)
di
. Similarly, each strong receiver j ∈ Ks assembles the decoded parts
and forms Wˆ
(B)
dj
.
Subphase 3: A capacity-achieving code is used to send the secured message tuple
sec
(
W
(A)
dKw+1
,KKw+1
)
, . . . , sec
(
W
(A)
dK
,KK
)
(183)
to the strong receivers Kw + 1, . . . ,K. Each strong receiver j ∈ Ks obtains its desired guess Wˆ
(A)
dj
with the help of the secret
key Kj stored in its cache memory.
At the end of the entire delivery phase, each Receiver k ∈ K assembles its guesses of W
(A)
dk
and W
(B)
dk
to produce the final
guess Wˆk.
Analysis: The scheme is analyzed by averaging over the random code constructions C. We first verify that in each of the
three subphases the average probability of decoding error tends to 0 as n→ ∞. Only weak receivers decode during the first
subphase. Probability of decoding error in Subphase 1 vanishes asymptotically as n→∞, because(
Kw
t+1
)(
Kw
t
)−1
R(B)
(1− δw)
=
Kw−t
t+1 R
(B)
(1− δw)
< β1. (184)
Only strong receivers decode during the third subphase. Probability of decoding error in Subphase 3 vanishes asymptotically,
because
KsR
(A)
(1 − δs)
< β3. (185)
In Subphase 2, probability of decoding error at weak receivers vanishes asymptotically, because
Kw−t+1
t
R(A)
(1− δw)
< β2. (186)
Probability of decoding error at strong receivers in Subphase 2 vanishes asymptotically, because
Kw−t+1
t
R(A) + KsR
(B)
(1 − δs)
< β2. (187)
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Whenever the decodings in all subphases are successful, all receivers guess their desired messages correctly. As a consequence,
also the average of the overall probability of error vanishes as n→∞.
We analyze the secrecy constraint. For fixed blocklength n:
1
n
I
(
W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n
∣∣C) = 1
n
I
(
W
(B)
d1
, . . . ,W
(B)
dKw
;Zβ1n1
∣∣C)+ 1
n
I
(
W
(A)
d1
, . . . ,W
(A)
dKw
,W
(B)
dKw+1
, . . . ,W
(B)
dK
;Z
(β1+β2)n
β1n+1
∣∣C)
+
1
n
I
(
W
(A)
dKw+1
, . . . ,W
(A)
dK
;Zn(β1+β2)n+1
∣∣C), (188)
because of the independence of the communications in the three subphases. The sizes of the secret keys have been chosen so
that the codewords to be sent in each of the three subphases are chosen uniformly at random over a subset of the random
codebooks that are equal to the minimum between (1 − δz) and the rates of communication. By Lemma 1 this proves that
1
n
I
(
W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n
∣∣C) tends to 0 as n→∞.
We can conclude that there must exist at least one choice of the codebooks so that for this choice both PWorste → 0 and
1
n
I
(
W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n
)
vanish asymptotically.
For each choice of the parameter t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}:
R = R(A) +R(B) = R˜(t+1) − ǫ. (189)
Moreover, each weak receiver requires a cache size of
Mw =
D
[
tR(A) + (t− 1)R(B)
]
Kw
+
(
Kw − 1
t
)
RKey,1 +
(
Kw − 1
t− 1
)
RKey,2 +
(
Kw − 1
t− 1
)
KsRKey,3 = M˜
(t+1)
w −
D(t− 1/2)
Kw
ǫ,
(190)
and each strong receiver a cache size of
Ms = RKey,4 +
(
Kw
t
)
RKey,3 = M˜
(t+1)
s . (191)
Taking ǫ → 0 thus proves achievability of the rate-memory triples (R˜(t+1), M˜
(t+1)
w , M˜
(t+1)
s ), for t ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw − 1}, in
(84d)–(84f).
C. Symmetric Secure Cache-Aided Piggyback Coding
Fix ǫ > 0 and define the time-sharing parameters
β1 :=
Kw(Kw − tw)(ts + 1)(1− δs)
2
Kw(Kw − tw)(ts + 1)(1− δs)2 + Ks(tw + 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks − ts)(1 − δw) + Kw(ts + 1)(1− δs)
] (192a)
β2 :=
KwKs(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δw)(1 − δs)
Kw(Kw − tw)(ts + 1)(1− δs)2 + Ks(tw + 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks − ts)(1 − δw) + Kw(ts + 1)(1− δs)
] (192b)
β3 :=
Ks(Ks − ts)(tw + 1)(1− δw)
2
Kw(Kw − tw)(ts + 1)(1− δs)2 + Ks(tw + 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks − ts)(1 − δw) + Kw(ts + 1)(1− δs)
] . (192c)
Notice that β1 + β2 + β3 = 1.
Choose two positive integers tw ∈ {1, . . . ,Kw} and ts ∈ {1, . . . ,Ks}.
Message splitting: Divide each message into two submessages,
Wd =
[
W
(A)
d ,W
(B)
d
]
, d ∈ D, (193)
so that the submessages are of rates
R(A) =
Kw(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δw)(1− δs)
2
Kw(Kw − tw)(ts + 1)(1− δs)2 + Ks(tw + 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks − ts)(1− δw) + Kw(ts + 1)(1− δs)
] − ǫ/2 (194)
and
R(B) =
Ks(tw + 1)(ts + 1)(1− δw)
2(1− δs)
Kw(Kw − tw)(ts + 1)(1− δs)2 + Ks(tw + 1)(1− δw)
[
(Ks − ts)(1− δw) + Kw(ts + 1)(1− δs)
] − ǫ/2. (195)
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Denote the
(
Kw
tw
)
subsets of {1, . . . ,Kw} of size tw by G
(tw)
1 , . . . , G
(tw)
(Kwtw)
and the
(
Ks
ts
)
subsets of {1, . . . ,Ks} of size ts by
G
(ts)
1 , . . . , G
(ts)
(Ksts)
. Divide every message W
(A)
d into
(
Kw
tw
)
submessages and every message W
(B)
d into
(
Ks
ts
)
submessages:
W
(A)
d =
{
W
(A)
d,G
(tw)
ℓ
: ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
tw
)}}
, (196a)
W
(B)
d =
{
W
(B)
d,G
(ts)
ℓ
: ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Ks
ts
)}}
. (196b)
Key generation:
• For each ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
tw+1
)}
, generate an independent random key K
G
(tw+1)
ℓ
of rate
RKey,1 =
(
Kw
tw + 1
)−1
· β1 min {1− δz, 1− δw} .
• For each ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Ks
ts+1
)}
, generate an independent random key K
G
(ts+1)
ℓ
of rate
RKey,2 =
(
Ks
ts + 1
)−1
· β3 min {1− δz, 1− δs} .
• For each i ∈ Kw and j ∈ Ks, generate an independent random key Kw,{i,j} of rate
RKey,3 =
β2
KwKs
min {1− δz , 1− δw} ,
and an independent random key Ks,{i,j} of rate
RKey,4 =
β2
KwKs
min
{
(δw − δz)
+, 1− δs
}
.
Placement phase: Place the cache contents as shown in the following table.
Cache at weak receiver i{{
W
(A)
d,G
(tw)
ℓ
}
i∈G
(tw)
ℓ
}D
d=1{
K
G
(tw+1)
ℓ
}
i∈G
(tw+1)
ℓ
Kw,{i,Kw+1}, . . .Kw,{i,K}
Ks,{i,Kw+1}, . . .Ks,{i,K}
Cache at strong receiver j
{{
W
(B)
d,G
(ts)
ℓ
}
j∈G
(ts)
ℓ
}D
d=1{
K
G
(ts+1)
ℓ
}
j∈G
(ts+1)
ℓ
Kw,{1,j}, . . .Kw,{Kw,j}
Ks,{1,j}, . . .Ks,{Kw,j}
Delivery phase: The delivery phase is divided into three subphases of lengths β1n, β2n and β3n.
Subphase 1: This phase conveys to each weak receiver i ∈ Kw, the parts of W
(A)
di
that are not stored in its cache memory.
Time-sharing is applied over
(
Kw
tw+1
)
equally-long periods of length n1 = β1n
(
Kw
tw+1
)−1
. Label the periodsG
(t+1)
1 , . . . , G
(t+1)
(Kwt+1)
.
In Period G
(t+1)
ℓ , for ℓ ∈
{
1, . . . ,
(
Kw
tw+1
)}
, the secured XOR-message
sec
( ⊕
i∈G
(tw+1)
ℓ
W
(A)
di,G
(tw+1)
ℓ
\{i}
, K
G
(tw+1)
ℓ
)
(197)
is sent to the subset of receivers G
(tw+1)
ℓ . Each receiver i ∈ G
(tw+1)
ℓ retrieves the content
K
G
(tw+1)
ℓ
and
{
W
(A)
dk,G
(tw+1)
ℓ
\{k}
}
k∈G
(tw+1)
ℓ
\{i}
(198)
from its cache memory. It then decodes the secured message in (197), and with the retrieved cache content (198) it recovers
the desired message W
(A)
di,G
(tw+1)
ℓ
\{i}
.
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Subphase 2: Submessages W
(B)
d1
, . . . ,W
(B)
dKw
are sent to weak receivers 1, . . . ,Kw and submessages W
(A)
dKw+1
, . . . ,W
(A)
dK
to
strong receivers Kw + 1, . . . ,K.
Time-sharing is applied over Kw · Ks periods, each of length n2 =
β2n
KwKs
. The periods are labeled {i, j}, for i ∈ Kw and
j ∈ Ks. Divide each submessage W
(B)
d into Ks parts
W
(B)
d =
(
W
(B)
d,Kw+1
, . . . ,W
(B)
d,K
)
(199a)
so that each part is of equal rate r(B) = R(B)/Ks and for all j ∈ Ks and d ∈ D, part W
(B)
d,j is stored in strong receiver j’s
cache memory. Similarly, divide each submessage W
(A)
d into Kw parts
W
(A)
d =
(
W
(A)
d,1 , . . . ,W
(A)
d,Kw
)
, (199b)
of equal rate r(A) = R(A)/Kw so that for each i ∈ Kw and d ∈ D, part W
(A)
d,i is stored in weak receiver i’s cache memory.
We describe the encoding and decoding operations in a period {i, j}, for i ∈ Kw and j ∈ Ks. In this period, the transmitter
sends the codeword
xn2{i,j}
(
sec
(
W
(B)
di,j
,Kw,{i,j}
)
; sec
(
W
(A)
dj ,i
,Ks,{i,j}
))
(200)
over the channel. At the end of the period, Receiver i first retrieves the cache content
Ks,{i,j}, W
(A)
dj ,i
, (201)
and forms the subcodebook
Crowpg,{i,j}
(
sec
(
W
(A)
dj ,i
,Ks,{i,j}
))
=
{
xn2{i,j}
(
ℓrow; sec
(
W
(A)
dj ,i
,Ks,{i,j}
))
: ℓrow ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌊
2nr
(B)⌋}}
. (202)
Based on this subcodebook, it then decodes the secured message sec
(
W
(B)
di,j
,Kw,{i,j}
)
, and recovers its desired message W
(B)
di,j
with the secret key Kw,{i,j} stored in its cache memory. Receiver j proceeds analogously, except that it retrieves the cache
content
Kw,{i,j}, W
(B)
di,j
, (203)
and forms the subcodebook
Ccolpg,{i,j}
(
sec
(
W
(B)
di,j
,Kw,{i,j}
))
=
{
xn2{i,j}
(
sec
(
W
(B)
di,j
,Kw,{i,j}
)
; ℓcol
)
: ℓcol ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌊
2nr
(A)⌋}}
. (204)
It then decodes the secured message sec
(
W
(A)
dj ,i
,Ks,{i,j}
)
, and recovers W
(A)
dj ,i
using the secret key Ks,{i,j} from its cache
memory.
Subphase 3: This subphase conveys to each strong receiver j ∈ Ks, the parts of submessage W
(B)
dj
that are not stored in
its cache memory. Encoding/decoding operations are obtained from the encoding/decoding operations for Subphase 1 if in the
latter the subscript w is replaced by the subscript s and the superscript (A) is replaced by the superscript (B).
Analysis: We analyze the average (over the random choice of the codebooks) probability of decoding error and the average
leakage 1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C).
We start by showing that the probability of decoding error vanishes in each of the three subphases. Only weak receivers
perform decoding operations in the first subphase. Probability of error in this subphase thus tends to 0 as n→∞, because
Kw−tw
tw+1
R(A)
(1− δw)
< β1 (205)
In the second subphase, both weak and strong receivers perform decoding operations. The probability of decoding error at
weak receivers tends to 0 as n→∞, because
KwR
(B)
(1− δw)
< β2 (206)
The probability of decoding error at strong receivers tends to 0 as n→∞, because
KsR
(A)
(1 − δs)
< β2. (207)
(Notice that by our choice of the subrates R(A) and R(B), the two decoding constraints of Subphase 2, (206) and (207) are
equally strong.) Only strong receivers perform decoding operations in the third subphase. The probability of error of these
decoding operations tends to 0 as n→∞, because
Ks−ts
ts+1
R(B)
(1− δs)
< β3 (208)
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Since all receivers correctly recover their demanded messages when all decoding operations tend to 0, when averaged over the
random code construction, the total probability of error tends to 0 as n→∞.
Communication is secured because the secret keys have been chosen sufficiently long. In fact, following the arguments
given in the previous Subsection VIII-B, it can be shown that the average leakage term 1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n|C) tends to 0
as n → ∞. By standard arguments, it can then be concluded that there must exist a choice of the codebooks so that for this
choice the probability of error PWorste and the leakage
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n) both vanish asymptotically as n→∞.
The presented scheme requires weak receivers to have a cache of size
Mw =
Dtw
Kw
R(A) +
(tw + 1)β1min {1− δz, 1− δw}
Kw
+
β2 min {1− δz , 2− δw − δs}
Kw
= M˜(Kw+tw(Ks+1)+ts)w −
Dtw
2Kw
ǫ, (209)
and strong receivers a cache of size
Ms =
Dts
Ks
R(B) +
(ts + 1)β3 min {1− δz, 1− δs}
Ks
+
β2 min {1− δz , 2− δw − δs}
Ks
= M˜(Kw+tw(Ks+1)+ts)s −
Dts
2Ks
ǫ. (210)
The rate of the messages is
R = R(A) +R(B) = R˜(Kw+tw(Ks+1)+ts) − ǫ. (211)
Thus, letting ǫ→ 0 establishes achievability of the desired rate-memory triples in (84g)–(84i):(
R˜(Kw+(tw−1)Ks+ts), M˜(Kw+(tw−1)Ks+ts)w , M˜
(Kw+(tw−1)Ks+ts)
s
)
. (212)
IX. SUMMARY
We have studied secrecy of cache-aided wiretap erasure BCs with Kw weak receivers, Ks strong receivers and one
eavesdropper. We have provided a general upper bound on the secrecy capacity-memory tradeoff for the case when receivers
have arbitrary erasure probabilities and arbitrary cache sizes. We have also proposed lower bounds on the secrecy capacity-
memory tradeoff for different cache sizes. For some cache arrangements, e.g., for zero cache sizes at strong receivers Ms = 0,
our upper and lower bounds coincide for small cache sizes. For Ms = 0, they also match for large cache sizes. These bounds
show that the secrecy constraint can induce a significant loss in capacity compared to the standard non-secure system, especially
when Ms = 0. They also exhibit that in a secure system, the caching gain with small cache memories is much more important
than its non-secure counterpart. This is due to the fact that secret keys can be stored in the caches, which are more useful than
cached data. For larger cache sizes, data has to be stored as well and the caching gains of the secure system are similar to the
gains in a standard system. We also present a lower bound on the capacity of a scenario where the cache assignment across
receivers can be optimized subject to a total cache budget Mtot. The lower bound is exact for small cache budgets Mtot.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For each blocklength n, we fix caching, encoding and decoding functions as in (16), (20) and (22) so that both the probability
of worst-case error and the secrecy leakage satisfy:
PWorste −−−−→
n→∞
0 and
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WD;Z
n) −−−−→
n→∞
0.
We only prove the lemma for the set S = {1, . . . , k}. For other sets S ⊆ {1, . . . ,K} the proof is similar.
By Fano’s inequality and because conditioning can only reduce entropy, there exists a sequence of real numbers {ǫn}
∞
n=1
with
ǫn
n
−−−−→
n→∞
0,
such that 

H(Wd1 |Y
n
1 , V1) ≤
ǫn
2K
,
H(Wd2 |Y
n
2 , V1, V2,Wd1) ≤
ǫn
2K
,
...
H(Wdk |Y
n
k , V1, . . . , Vk,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk−1) ≤
ǫn
2K
.
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Thus,
nR = H(Wd1)
= H(Wd1 |Z
n) + I(Wd1 ;Z
n)
≤ H(Wd1 |Z
n) +
ǫn
2
≤ I(Wd1 ;Y
n
1 , V1)− I(Wd1 ;Z
n) +H(Wd1 |Y
n
1 , V1) +
ǫn
2
≤ I(Wd1 ;Y
n
1 , V1)− I(Wd1 ;Z
n) + ǫn
≤ I(Wd1 ;Y
n
1 |V1)− I(Wd1 ;Z
n|V1) + I(Wd1 ;V1|Z
n) + ǫn
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 ;Y1,i|V1, Y
i−1
1 )− I(Wd1 ;Zi|V1, Z
n
i+1)
]
+ nM1 + ǫn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 ;Y1,i|V1, Y
i−1
1 )− I(Wd1 ;Zi|V1, Z
n
i+1)
]
+ nM1 + ǫn
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zni+1;Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , V1,Wd1)− I(Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|Z
n
i+1, V1,Wd1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 , Z
n
i+1;Y1,i|V1, Y
i−1
1 )− I(Wd1 , Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|V1, Z
n
i+1)
]
+ nM1 + ǫn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 , Z
n
i+1;Y1,i|V1, Y
i−1
1 )− I(Wd1 , Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|V1, Z
n
i+1)
]
+ nM1 + ǫn
−
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zni+1;Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , V1)− I(Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|Z
n
i+1, V1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 ;Y1,i|V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(Wd1 ;Zi|V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)
]
+ nM1 + ǫn
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 ;Y1,i|V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(Wd1 ;Zi|V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)
]+
+ nM1 + ǫn
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)− I(V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)
]+
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)− I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)
]+
+ nM1 + ǫn
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)− I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)
]+
+ nM1 + ǫn
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−12 ;Y1,i|Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)
]+
(g)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)− I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
1 , Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)
]+
+ nM1 + ǫn
(h)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1;Y1,i)− I(Wd1 , V1, Y
i−1
2 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)
]+
+ nM1 + ǫn, (213)
where (a) holds because I(Wd1 ;V1|Z
n) is limited by the entropy of V1 which cannot exceed nM1; (b) and (c) follow by the
chain rule of mutual information and by applying Csiszar’s sum-identity [17, pp. 25]; (d) holds because for all values of x
we have: x ≤ x+ and 0 ≤ x+; (e) and (g) hold because if the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to Receiver 1, then all
[·]+ terms are positive and if Receiver 1 is degraded with respect to the eavesdropper then all these terms are zero; (f) holds
because 0 ≤ x+ for all values of x; and (g) holds because Receiver 1 is degraded with respect to Receiver 2 and thus the
following Markov chain holds:
(V1,Wd1 , Z
n
i+1, Y1,i, Zi)→ Y
i−1
2 → Y
i−1
1 .
Let Q be a random variable uniform over {1, . . . , n} and independent of all the previously defined random variables. We define
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the following random variables:
U1 :=
(
Wd1 , V1, Y
Q−1
2 , Z
n
Q+1
)
, (214)
Y1 := Y1,Q, (215)
Z := ZQ. (216)
Dividing by n, we can now rewrite the above inequality as
R ≤
n∑
q=1
Pr{Q = q}
[
I(Wd1 , V1, Y
q−1
2 , Z
n
q+1;Y1,q|Q = q)− I(Wd1 , V1, Y
q−1
2 , Z
n
q+1;Zq|Q = q)
]+
+M1 +
ǫn
n
≤
[
I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;Z|Q)
]+
+M1 +
ǫn
n
. (217)
We now derive a similar bound as before, but involving Receivers 1, . . . , k. Consider
kR ≤
1
n
H(Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk)
=
1
n
H(Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk |Z
n) +
1
n
I(Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk ;Z
n)
≤
1
n
H(Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk |Z
n) +
ǫn
2n
(a)
≤
1
n
[
H(Wd1) +H(Wd2 |Wd1) + . . .+H(Wdk |Wdk−1 , . . . ,Wd1)− I(Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk ;Z
n)
]
+
ǫn
2n
(b)
≤
1
n
[
I(Wd1 ;Y
n
1 , V1) + I(Wd2 ;Y
n
2 , V1, V2|Wd1) + . . .+ I(Wdk ;Y
n
k , V1, . . . , Vk|Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk−1)
− I(Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk ;Z
n)
]
+
ǫn
n
(c)
=
1
n
[
I(Wd1 ;Y
n
1 , V1)− I(Wd1 ;Z
n)
]
+
1
n
k∑
ℓ=2
[
I(Wdℓ ;Y
n
ℓ , V1, . . . , Vℓ|Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1)− I(Wdℓ ;Z
n|Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1)
]
+
ǫn
n
=
1
n
[
I(Wd1 ;Y
n
1 |V1)− I(Wd1 ;Z
n|V1) + I(Wd1 ;V1|Z
n)
]
+
1
n
k∑
ℓ=2
[
I(Wdℓ ;Y
n
ℓ |V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1)− I(Wdℓ ;Z
n|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1)
+ I(Wdℓ ;V1, . . . , Vℓ|Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Z
n)
]
+
ǫn
n
, (218)
where (a) follows from the chain rule of mutual information; (b) follows from Fano’s inequality; and (c) follows from the
chain rule of mutual information.
In a similar way to (217), we can prove that
1
n
[
I(Wd1 ;Y
n
1 |V1)− I(Wd1 ;Z
n|V1)
]
≤
[
I(U1;Y1|Q)− I(U1;Z|Q)
]+
. (219)
Then, we prove that for each ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , k}, the following set of inequalities holds:
I(Wdℓ ;Y
n
ℓ |V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1)− I(Wdℓ ;Z
n|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wℓ−1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wdℓ ;Yℓ,i|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
− I(Wdℓ ;Zi|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
]
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wdℓ ;Yℓ,i|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
− I(Wdℓ ;Zi|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
]
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wdℓ ;Yℓ,i|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
− I(Wdℓ ;Zi|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
]+
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+
n∑
i=1
[
I(Vℓ;Yℓ,i|V1, . . . , Vℓ−1,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
− I(Vℓ;Zi|V1, . . . , Vℓ−1,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
]+
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wdℓ , Vℓ;Yℓ,i|V1, . . . , Vℓ−1,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
− I(Wdℓ , Vℓ;Zi|V1, . . . , Vℓ−1,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
]+
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−1ℓ+1 ;Yℓ,i|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
− I(Y i−1ℓ+1 ;Zi|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
]+
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Wdℓ , Vℓ, Y
i−1
ℓ+1 ;Yℓ,i|V1, . . . , Vℓ−1,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
− I(Wdℓ , Vℓ, Y
i−1
ℓ+1 ;Zi|V1, . . . , Vℓ−1,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Y
i−1
2 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ , Z
n
i+1)
]+
, (220)
where (a) follows from the chain rule of mutual information and by applying Csiszar’s sum-identity; (b) because Receivers
1, . . . , ℓ− 1 are degraded with respect to Receiver ℓ, and so the following Markov chain holds:
(Wdℓ , Yℓ,i, V1, . . . , Vk,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1 , Z
n
i+1)→ Y
i−1
ℓ → (Y
i−1
1 , . . . , Y
i−1
ℓ−1 ); (221)
(c) holds because for all values of x we have: x ≤ x+ and 0 ≤ x+; (d) holds because if the eavesdropper is degraded with
respect to Receiver ℓ, then all [·]+ terms are positive and if Receiver ℓ is degraded with respect to the eavesdropper than all
these terms are zero.
We define for each k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} the random variables
Yk := Yk,Q (222)
Uk := (Wdk , Vk, Y
Q−1
k+1 , Uk−1). (223)
Dividing by n, we can rewrite constraint (220) as
1
n
[
I(Wℓ;Y
n
ℓ |V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1)− I(Wℓ;Z
n|V1, . . . , Vℓ,Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1)
]
≤
k∑
ℓ=1
[
I(Uℓ;Yℓ|Uℓ−1, Q)− I(Uℓ;Z|Uℓ−1, Q)
]+
. (224)
Finally, we bound the following sum:
I(Wd1 ;V1|Z
n) +
k∑
ℓ=2
I(Wdℓ ;V1, . . . , Vℓ|Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1, Z
n)
≤ I(Wd1 ;V1 . . . , Vk|Z
n) +
k∑
ℓ=2
I(Wdℓ ;V1, . . . , Vk|Wd1 , . . . ,Wdℓ−1, Z
n)
= I(Wd1 , . . . ,Wdk ;V1, . . . , Vk|Z
n)
≤ n
k∑
ℓ=1
Mℓ. (225)
Taking into consideration constraints (219), (224) and (225), we can rewrite constraint (218) as:
kR ≤
k∑
ℓ=1
[
I(Uℓ;Yℓ|Uℓ−1, Q)− I(Uℓ;Z|Uℓ−1, Q)
]+
+
k∑
ℓ=1
Mℓ +
ǫn
n
, (226)
where U0 is a constant.
Letting n→∞, from constraints (217) and (226), we conclude that Lemma 2 holds.
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